Fontainebleau France
| ENHANCEMENT OF NON STRUCTURAL FLOOD MITIGATION MEASURES IN EUROPE Fontainebleau France |
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Leszek Bialy LJBIALY@YAHOO.COM Rienk Stuive RIENKSTUIVE@NETSCAPE.NET Mariya Potabenko, Zhanna Serdyukova, Maria Szemplinska European Postgraduate Course in Environmental Management European Institute for Sustainable Development (IEDD); Ecole des Mines de Paris, ISIGE Table of content Preface Acknowledgements Summary 1. Introduction 2. Objectives and methodology 3. Background information and problem definition 3.1. Introduction 3.2. Description of the problem 3.2.1. The flooding event in the basin of the River Somme in April 2001 3.2.2. The flooding event in the basin of the River Odra in summer 1997 3.3. Problem definition 3.3.1. Structural and non-structural anti-flood measures 3.3.2. The definition of the main problems 3.4. Conclusions 4. Problem analysis - deficiencies in flood management administrative structure of France and Poland. 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Flood management in France 4.3. Flood management in Poland. 4.4. Flood management in Europe 4.4.1. EU legislation 4.4.2. EU Water legislation 4.4.3. Directorate General XII and RIPARIUS 4.4.4. Directorate General XI Environment 4.4.5. EU Water directive 4.5. Conclusions 4.6. Measures 4.6.1. Regulatory instruments 4.6.2. Social instruments 4.6.3. Organisational changes 5. Problem analysis - socially attenuated risk perception of the slow flood hazard. 5.1. Introduction 5.2. Problem description and analysis 5.2.1. Risk and risk perception 5.2.2. Evolution analysis of the risk perception of the slow flood hazard in the Somme valley 5.2.3 Evolution analysis of the risk perception of the flood hazard in River Odra basin. 5.3. Conclusions 5.4. Measures 5.4.1. Social instruments. 5.4.2. Flood plain zoning 6. Problem analysis - shortcomings of flood damage recovery and compensation in France and Poland. 6.1 Introduction 6.2 General description of the problem 6.2.1 French insurance system 6.2.2 Polish insurance system 6.3 Conclusions 6.4 Measures 7. Conclusions 8. Recommendations References Appendix I. Map of Poland (Odra and Vystula rivers) 99 Appendix II. Water management structure in Poland 100 Appendix III. Map of Polish Voivodships (regions). 101 Appendix IV. Territorial competence of respective RZGWs 102 Appendix V. Map of Picardie region 103 Appendix VI. Water agencies in France 104 Appendix VII. Water management structure in France 104 Appendix VIII. Table of responsibilities for natural risks in France 106 Appendix IX. List if contacts 107 Appendix X. Abbreviations 109 Preface EPCEM is a one-year full-time programme with students from European countries. The programme focuses on combining the theoretical knowledge with practical skills in the field of European environmental policy-making and environmental management. The emphasis is on interdisciplinary approaches to problem analysis and problem solving. One of the practical experiences is to participate in a four-month research project, which is carried out by groups of five or six members. This project has been conducted at the ISIGE, Ecole des Mines de Paris. The members of the project group, their home countries and their background are: Leszek Bialy...............Poland................Engineering/Plant Protection Mariya Potabenko......Ukraine...............Sociology Zhanna Serdyukova ...Russia.................Environmental Sciences Rienk Stuive...............The Netherlands..Management and Organisation Maria Szemplinska .....Poland................Environmental Sciences/ Aquatic Ecology Supervisors: Frederique Vincent........ISIGE, Ecole des Mines de Paris Ckees van Oijen...........IVAM, University of Amsterdam Acknowledgements We would like to acknowledge Professor Mrs.Frédérique Vincent for enabling us to write this report at the ISIGE, Ecole des Mines de Paris, providing technical background, expert knowledge, contacts and materials. We are especially grateful to Mr.Philippe Jamet, Mr.Dominique Levet, Mr.Yves Richer de Forges, Mr.Stanislav Wicherek for their outstanding participation and many valuable comments, which influenced the course of our work. The analysis underlying this study has also benefited from the contribution of Mr.Ernst Schulte and Mrs.Bernadette de Vanssay who gave the information on their expert areas. We would like to thank to Mrs.Jasha Oosterbaan-Eritzpokhoff, Mr.Pierre d'Ovidio, Mrs.Marylene Carpentier for the provided materials and technical support. The contribution of Mrs.Patricia Fraile is also gratefully acknowledged. Summary Background information and problem definition The floods have a periodic character in the valley of the Somme River. At the end of March 2001, the inundation started slowly progressing. The rise of water to differing degree was recorded in 45 communes. The dimension of the floods as of April 2001 is considerable: 108 municipalities got directly concerned, 3 500 flooded dwellings, more than 1 100 evacuated persons. Less than ten municipalities incurred the majority of the damage and the difficulties associated with the inundation. They are Abbeville, Fontaine-Sur-Somme, Mareuil-Caubert, Amiens, Cagny and Camon. The major part of the Odra river basin consists of the lowland are (200 m above sea level). The average annual precipitation in the mountainous area constitutes 1 000-1 300 mm. The flood of 1997 on the Odra river exceeded norms during several weeks. The exceeding of historical absolute maximum water level persisted up 16 days. The experts defined three rainstorms, which formed the flood. As a reasons for the Somme River and the Odra River floods, the experts considered exceptional intensive precipitation covering large areas. Anti-flood measures are classified into structural and non-structural measures. Non-structural measures comprise regulations and policies, flood defence and flood insurance. These measures strive to reduce flood impacts without altering flood characteristics and focus on policies and emergency measures. Structural measures aim to reduce flood volume and peaks, and thereby protect people and property against flood damages. Traditionally, more attention has been paid to structural measures (embankments, dikes, dams, polders, and flood plains). However, the mentioned measures are not always relevant and efficient. Therefore, they are left out of the scope of the present study. The importance of non-structural measures is emphasised (adequate risk perception forming, implementation and development of effective financial instruments, creation of smooth co-ordination system). The non-structural measures are to cover the following three main problems existing in flood management: - Poor co-ordination and scattered organisation of the flood management in Europe; - Socially attenuated risk perception of the slow flood hazard; - Shortcomings of financial instruments, particularly, insurance. Problem analysis - deficiencies in flood management administrative structure of France and Poland One of the non-structural measures of flood management is regulation. Consistent regulations based on proper risk maps is a good non-structural measure against the risk of floods. The role of the national governments on flood prevention and protection is limited both in France and Poland. On the European level there is hardly any legislation on floods. In France, the role of the state is mainly identifying of the risks and communicating them to the local authorities, planning of the land, preparing of risk prevention plans. The water policy is defined by the State in partnership with local communities and users. The water resources are managed at three levels: the national Water Committee, the River basin Committee, and the Local Water Commission. The International Water Office is an association network, involving a variety of organisations and institutions that deal with water affairs. In Poland, the main administrative organ dealing with water management is the Ministry of the Environment. Other institutions responsible for the management of water resources are the Regional Water Development Authorities, and the Office of Water Management. The administration of the state-owned surface waters is divided between the provincial Boards of Land Improvement and Water Facilities. WWF is one of the active NGO, acting in the flood management in Poland. On the EU level, all the legislation that has ever been adopted, mainly dealt with the quality of water. For dealing with floods, the RIPARIUS project, funded by the DG XII, played an important role. The units of DG XI Environment are responsible for all water legislation in Europe and for the development of measures to increase the protection of the citizens in case of natural hazards. Recently adopted EU Water directive offers an integrated framework for EU water policy, harmonises river basin management at member state level, and improves the protection of surface and groundwater. For the better flood mitigation in Europe regulatory instruments, social instruments and organisational changes are proposed as the measures to be taken to deal with floods. As the regulatory instruments flood mitigation programs can be mentioned. The programs should include regulation, positive and negative economic incentives, and other ways to encourage behavioural changes to reduce risks. Social instruments include public participation in decision making and educational programs. Organisational changes assume improvement of co-ordination and communication systems. Problem analysis - socially attenuated risk perception of the slow flood hazard Risk perception by the general public is essential information in decision-making concerning floods. Memory of risk, legislation, education, structural and non-structural measures, mass media, social and cultural background are the main factors of the risk perception. In the Somme river valley, the risk perception of the slow flooding is low. The memory of risk in the region is absent. The reasons of than might be a slow character of the event and a strong trust in technical measures. Individuals did not take any preventive measures to eliminate or reduce risk of flooding. The population of the Somme valley has a tendency to be low informed on the natural risks threatening their living residences. The mass media here is not very well employed and could be of great use in the future. In Poland, people's opinion concerning the likelihood of flood risk has changed radically as a consequence of the 1997 flood in Odra river basin. The change in people's risk perception is a positive thing. This positive experience should be used to promote public involvement in the flood management. Some measures should be found and implemented to form the adequate risk perception of those who live in flood-prone areas. People tend to rely on the government to protect them from flood. To deal with floods and form the realistic risk perception, both in Poland and France non-structural measures are proposed (social instruments and flood plain zoning). The government applies social instruments to persuade social actors to change their behaviour. Social instruments include organisation of public hearings, citizen advisory committee and task forces, citizens' juries and citizens' panels, strengthening of informal water management structure, creation of information-co-ordination centres, mass media campaigns, general public education, campaigns designed to alter public behaviour. The proposed measures should support the integration of risk perception into the flood management policy and enhance the slow flood risk perception of ordinary people, civil servants, and local authorities. Problem analysis - shortcomings of flood damage recovery and compensation in France and Poland In both countries - France and Poland - the lack of co-ordination of organisations responsible for the post crisis management and financial recovery exists. The coverage is fragmented and property owners have to purchase different policies in order to insure themselves against the disasters. The distribution of money for flood mitigation is not sufficient. There is no quick reaction to the losses incurred by all parties involved. State and insurance companies' aid often comes after a long time. Both in France and Poland, there is no unified system of premium calculation based on proper risk assessment. An absence of maps of flood-prone areas is a big problem while assessing the risk. The French system of insurance is characterised by the combination of insurance and solidarity. It provides compensation for property and company damage. Due to solidarity, people are mostly insured because general obligatory insurance provides recovery for some damage suffered in a state of natural disaster. The recovery system guarantees that a part of any policy recovers the losses caused by a natural disaster. The French compensation system does not exclude other forms of aid, such as public and private donations, subsidies from the state, regions, municipalities and the European Union. The main limitations in the present insurance system are the inequity between the insured and a lack of incentives addressing risk prevention. In Poland, the insurance sector is still weak and not in a position to calculate a realistic premium to build up a flood insurance portfolio. There are no responsible bodies except insurance companies for flood damage compensation. People suffered from floods received compensation only if they were insured against flood damage. Those who were not insured received some help from other organisations or were dependent on other donations. The insurance companies do not assess flood risk data, based on zoning information. Different options exist for the compensation of flood damage. The first one is the victims should bear the damage caused by floods; the second one - private insurance companies should cover the losses; the third and the fourth options are relying on social self-regulation (particularly, on charity organisations) and governmental support. Compensation systems can differ from total compensations by government for flood damage to an insurance without governmental support. Economic instruments to be mentioned are fiscal instruments and subsidies. Conclusions The combination of structural and non-structural means could bring significant benefits to the flooded communities regarding sustainable flood management. The non-structural tools are proposed and assessed from the institutional, social and financial dimensions. The assessment of the measures is carried out according to three criteria, such as public acceptance, administrative feasibility, economic costs, and the time factor. Recommendations The governments of France and Poland should employ more non-structural anti-flood measures to mitigate the losses of communities in case of floods. Proper risk assessment of flood-prone areas should be completed on the European level. Risk maps should be prepared based on the historical data using the latest technologies for all flood-prone regions in Europe and the accession countries. The European Commission DG Environment unit B1, responsible for the EU water framework directive, should implement some recommendations on flood mitigation in the directive. Member states should implement central flood mitigation legislation based on proper risk assessment. France and Poland should evaluate the building of houses in flood-prone areas and the flood recovery programs after the central legislation is implemented. The French government, concerning flood recovery, should investigate the possibilities for the implementation of a new recovery system in which the focus is put more on private insurance. The Polish government should enhance risk perception of people, local politicians and experts in flood-prone areas. The better co-ordination and co-operation of water management bodies, organisations and experts on flood mitigation should be established in both countries. On the European level, the thematic conferences could be organised every four years. 1. Introduction Floods in general can be described as situations of extreme water run off during which human lives, property and infrastructure are threatened. Encyclopedia defines floods as: "inundation of land by the rise and overflow of a body of water". Floods occur most commonly when water comes from heavy rainfall, from melting ice and snow, or from a combination of these factors that exceeds the carrying capacity of the river system, lake, or ocean into which it runs. Media often present flood events as rare and random nature caprices inflicted unexpectedly on the victims. The reality, however, is very different. Floods are recurring phenomena characteristic of all rivers basins and lowland coastal systems. In an average year, they bring important benefits to millions of people who depend on these environments. But mainly, floods are the largest cause of economic losses from natural disasters, mostly in more developed countries. They are also the major cause of disaster related deaths. Despite recent advances in understanding of the flooding factors and greater investments in flood reduction measures, floods take a larger number of lives and damage more properties each year than before, mainly because of unwise land management practices and growing human vulnerability. Floods are the most common natural disasters in Europe and in terms of economic damage the most costly ones. Over a 25-year period (1971-95), there were 154 major floods in Europe and in 1996 alone there were 9 flooding events. The costs of flood damage in Europe between 1991 and 1995 have been estimated at €99 billion. Floods concern to a varying degree almost every member state in the European Union and accession countries to a varying degree. Precipitation is the main driving force inducting floods but the adverse effects of floods are intensified by some particular pressing human activities. The main pressures are climate change, land sealing, changes in catchment and floodplain land use, population growth, urbanization, roads and railways construction as well as hydraulic and engineering measures. It is expected that in future decades the frequency and magnitude of floods will increase as a result of climate change and human activity. Therefore, the main present long-term emphasis is on living with floods rather than on fighting them. There are two types of floods: flash floods and slow floods. Flash floods are usually associated with isolated and localized very intense rainfall events occurring in small and medium sized basins. Peak discharges are maintained for hours or even minutes. Flash floods are common in mountanious rivers. Of special interest in the present study are the slow floods. Slow flood events are characterized by flooding of extensive areas, slower responses to the cause of the flood and longer duration. Peak discharges may last from a number of days till several weeks. As rising of water level is relatively slow and response times are long, there are more chances for real time forecasting and mitigation measures (ex. evacuation and flood protection). Nonetheless, the impact of the slow floods and the economic damage caused may be substantial because of the size of the flooded area and that on many occasions the exposed communities are not prepared for the flood risk. The European Institute of Sustainable Development headquartered in France (Institut Européen du Développement Durable - IEDD) requested the present study concerned with the recent flooding event in the department of Picardie, France, namely, the inundation of the Somme valley in April 2001. That flooding event brought significant economical damage to the region and, luckily, no casualties. It is expected that such phenomena might be repeated in the future with a greater magnitude in other regions of France as well. The traditional technical anti-flood measures have turned out to be inefficient to protect the population from the flood. Therefore, the task given by the commissioner is to identify and recommend the non-structural (social and institutional) measures to be taken to prevent or reduce the risk of flood hazard. The present report contains the recommendation for non-structural measures to be implemented by interdisciplinary crosscutting procedures combining technical and non-technical means. The structural measures are out of scope of this paper. The present research might be of interest to the following stakeholders: water management specialists, municipal authorities, insurance companies, educational and research institutes, non-governmental organizations, European Commission and European Parliament, individuals concerned. To give the profound insight into the best non-structural practices, it is considered appropriate to do the benchmarking of the socio-economic tools employed in a Western European country and a country in accession, in France and Poland. As a case study in Poland, the present research will focus on the flooding event in the Odra River flooded in 1997. An area of 665 000 ha of land were flooded. That flooding event caused significant material damage and 54 fatalities. No benchmarking research of this kind has been done before. Therefore, the comparison of two similar events in two European countries, France and Poland, will make it possible to propose the best public policies to tackle the problem of the slow flooding in a better way. Also, to study the state-of-the-art practices regarding the flood hazard on the European level interviews were held in Brussels. The present research is structured in the following way. In the Chapter below, the methodology of the present research and its objectives are presented. Chapter 3 starts with a description of the slow floods related problems which are of special interest in the present study, namely: socially attenuated risk perception of the slow flood, ineffective flood management administrative structure, poorly developed and unadjusted insurance system. Also, the background information on two case studies is given in more detail. Chapter 4 comprises the description and profound analyses of flood management administrative structures in France and Poland. The Chapter 5 gives a deep insight into the problem of perception of the flood hazard based on two case studies in the valley of River Somme and River Odra. It ends up with conclusions and recommendations on possible non-structural measures. Chapter 6 deals in more detail with French and Polish insurance systems targeting the compensation for the flood hazard. All the three Chapters are structured in such a way to answer the questions: what is the problem, why is it a problem, and what are the causes. Non-structural measures are proposed at the end of every problem analysis Chapter. Final conclusions and recommendations for the near future are given in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, respectively. 2. Objectives and methodology The aim of the present project is to contribute to the efforts of all stakeholders active on the national, international and regional level and involved in the slow floods prevention and protection management. The central objective of the project is to recommend the best non-structural measures to reduce or eliminate the risk of slow flood hazard based on the results of the benchmarking of two case studies in France and Poland. With a purpose to fulfill the central task, several secondary objectives have been set up: - To give the insight into the risk perception of the flood hazard by directly concerned groups in France and Poland; - To give an overview and analyze the French and Polish administrative structures dealing with the flood hazard; - To assess the effectiveness of such a powerful social instrument as the insurance employed in France and Poland; - To assess the possible policy measures targeting flood protection and mitigation, and select the best applicable measures for France and Poland. The methodology applied in the present research is as follows: most of the data used and presented in this report was collected from the Internet and from libraries. However, the benchmarking of local public policies, associated with flood events in Europe, assumes the necessity of cross-national survey. In the present research, expert surveys in France, Poland and Brussels were conducted during three weeks. Representatives of Ministries, local authorities, international technical assistance projects, NGOs, mass media, educational institutions and state officials have been interviewed. The names of the organizations and the contacted persons are given in Appendix IX. The recommended measures are based on the information about already existing and internationally recognized social and environmental instruments. The sources of the collected materials from the Internet and from libraries are listed in the References and a list of used literature. The paper is provided with Annexes on the following information resources and research materials: maps of Poland and France, water managemet structures existing in France and Poland, list of contacts etc. 3. Background information and problem definition 3.1. Introduction For the last few years the problem of floods in Europe has become more and more considerable. Flood events happen in the different parts of Europe. They cause huge damage to people who live in the region. Floods also cause economical damage and harm the environment of the region . Since floods in Europe have a tendency to appear more and more frequently, to cause higher cost damages, and to be less predictable, there is a clear need in the public policy, associated to flood events. This is more important because taken technical anti-floods measures are not very often appropriate and efficient. The present paper as its goal has to define, on the basis of the benchmarking of two case studies in France and in Poland, what are the best non-technical measures in anti-flood management which should be implemented on the national, international and regional level for slow floods prevention and mitigation. This Chapter has the following structure. In section 3.2., flood events in Poland and France are described, including damages and measures taken before, during and after the events. Main problems, associated to the events, are identified and briefly analysed in section 3.3. Afterwards, structural and non-structural measures and the difference between them are defined and evaluated. Finally, the conclusions are made in section 3.4. 3.2. Description of the problem 3.2.1. The flooding event in the basin of the River Somme in April 2001 Background information The valley of the River Somme presents a very complex structure together with numerous tributaries, ponds, swamps, pits, and canals. Altogether, they compose 5 560 sq.km of the basin of the Somme. The length of the River Somme is 245 km. It starts at Fonsommes, around 10 km to the east of Saint-Quentin and it falls into La Manche. On its way, the river crosses several big urban centres, such as Saint Quentin, Peronne, Amiens and Abbeville. Among the numerous tributaries, the biggest ones are, on the right bank, Omignon, Hallue, Nivre and Scardon, and on the left, bank, there are Avre, Selle, Saint-Landon, Airaine and Ambroise. The Somme is very extensively channelled, mainly with a purpose to connect the region of Saint-Quentin with the sea. France is divided into 95 departments in the metropolitan France and 4 overseas. A department is a chief administrative division governed by the prefect (a préfet). Each department, in turn, is divided into various municipalities (communes). Overall, on the territory of France there are 36,000 municipalities, some with less than 25 inhabitants. The basin of the Somme River is situated on the territory of Picardie region. The administrative cover of the River Somme itself and its tributaries is very much confusing. The regional environmental authority (DIREN) of the Nord-Pas-de-Calais department surveys and manages the measuring stations on the Somme and the DIREN of Picardie manages the measuring stations on its tributaries. In the light of the inundation of April 2001, such administrative organisation turned out to lack drastically any co-ordination and co-operation (the data on precipitation, level of the groundwaters, level of the Somme and its tributaries were not put together to draw a comprehensive picture of the starting flood). Therefore, the responsible authorities missed an early stage when it was possible to foresee the significance and the duration of the starting inundation. Flood event in the River Somme basin, April 2001 The floods have a periodic character in the valley of the Somme River. Nevertheless, the Somme has never been considered as a river prone to catastrophic floods. An evidence of it is the fact that in the departmental scheme of risk analysis and cover (le schéma départmental d'analyse et de couverture des risques - SDACR) there is one page only devoted to the risk of floods. Before the 17th century, no extraordinary rising of the Somme was recorded. After that the three flooding events, occurred one after another in the period of fifty years, February 1615, 1635 and 1658. After a strong rising of the Somme in 1716, the town of Amiens was once again afflicted in 1718, when the citizens remained at the top of their houses for eight days without being able to leave the roofs. In 1784, the Picardie was intensively flooded, as the most of France, with a lot of damage in particular in Amiens. In January 1799, there was an overflow of the Somme river, which caused considerable damage around Abbeville. Later on, the flooding events were recorded in 1820 and 1823, then in January 1840. In 1841, the water of the channelled Somme overflowed the dams and spread in several points along the valley. As mentioned in the report of the Commission of Inquiry on the causes of the inundation in the Somme valley (founded by the resolution of the Senate on May 9, 2001), all the previous floods, in spite of their sometime rather severe character, were characterised as relatively fast. The significant floods, which have occurred during the last ten years, are as follows: - August 1987 (221 interventions in the sector of Vimeu), - February 1988 (rise of water in the sector of Fountain-on-Somme and Warloy-Muzzle), - February 2 - March 26, 1990 (partial rupture of the Bas-Champs dam and significant damage in the sector of Cayeux), - May-June-August 1992 (300 interventions of the security and fire brigade), - December 1993 (353 interventions, rise of the Somme River and overflow of the ponds), - May 1994 (127 interventions following violent storms), - March 1995 (150 interventions on the coastal sector), - December 1999 (evacuation of more than 800 inhabitants from Doullens and Martainneville departments). At the end of March, the inundation started slowly progressing. The rise of water to differing degree was recorded in 45 communes. The inhabitants concerned put their furniture and valuable belongings upper in the house. On March 23, the first decisions on inhabitants' evacuation were made in the three communes: Boves, Gorenflos and Fountain-on-Nap. At the beginning of April, the rise of the water level speeded up. The number of concerned dwellings passed from 60 on March 28, to 890 ones on April 2, but the damage was different from case to case. From mid-April and until the beginning of May, the progression got slower, some water descent was recorded. On May 2, for the first time, a fall of the water level was noted in Abbeville. In the following days, a general slow water descent started. A brief observation of the flooding event in the River Somme Valley in spring 2001 is provided in table 1 below. Table 1. Flooding events on the Somme River, spring 2001 Dates Number of Flooded Municipalities Number of Flooded dwellings Number of evacuated inhabitants Comments 18-23rd March Limited interventions of the first-aid organisations; the first evacuation on March 23rd; 24-28th March Less than 50 Less than 100 Less than 100 29-30th March 51 125 112 31 March - 1st April Less than 55 337 326 2-3rd April 56 1 021 410 4-8th April 64 Less than 1 200 More than 600 Destruction of the railway 9-14th April 85 2 422 937 Strong progression of the water rise 15-21st April 113 2 560 1 029 Stabilisation at the high level 22-25th April 117 2 800 Less than 1 000 Overall stabilisation except Abbevile 26-30th April 125 1 500 Less than 1 100 Relative stabilisation, review of the flooded dwellings 1st - 4th May 130 Less than 1 500 Less than 1 100 Slight fall 5-9th May 130 Less than 1 500 Less than 1 000 General tendency to fall From 10th May Strong continuation of the fall However, it should be noted that starting from October, the valley of the Somme River was receiving the exceptional precipitation. The level of water started slowly raising constituting a major hydrological phenomenon of that kind at the end of March. This meteorological event provoked floods not only at the north-west of France but also in Grate Britain and Spain. It was characterised by exceptional number of raining days (26 days in March 2001) and the total cumulative ever recorded in the area for more than a century. Chart 1. Precipitation in Abbevile town in the period October-April 1945-2001, mm The last flooding event recorded for the town of Abbevile was in spring 1995. However, if one compares the total precipitation for the 3 towns of the department of Picardie (Abbeville, Amiens-Glisy, Villers-Carbonnel) for the periods of 1994-1995 and 2000-2001, it makes clear that during autumn 1994 - spring 1995 Abbeville, a coastal town, was the only one heavily precipitated whereas the precipitation for other two sites was sharply weaker and more or less normal for the rest of the department. The situation was different in autumn 2000 - spring 2001. The level of the precipitation was the same for the three sites mentioned. The fact that it remained at more or less the same high level contributed to the aggravation of the situation. According to the report of the Senate Inquiry Commission , the cause of the extreme flooding event in the Somme valley was, in the first place, the rain. The matter is that the previous two years (1998-2000) were rainy as well. The intensity of the precipitation just doubled during autumn-winter 2000 - 2001 (see Chart 2). Chart 2. Precipitation in three towns in the Somme valley during the period 1995-2001 Swamps and marshy land, which surround the river and play a role of "a towel", also regulate the level of water in the Somme. Due to exceptional precipitation, the "towel" was over-saturated and the water was not anymore absorbed inundating more and more area. The level of groundwaters significantly determines the level of surface waters. Again, because of extraordinary amount of rain fallen the groundwaters started rising and contributed to long duration of the flooding event in April 2001. The dimension of the floods as of April 2001 is considerable: 108 municipalities got directly concerned, 3.500 flooded dwellings, more than 1.100 evacuated persons. Less than ten municipalities incurred the majority of the damage and the difficulties associated with the inundation. They are Abbeville, Fontaine-sur-Somme, Mareuil-Caubert, Amiens, Cagny and Camon. Individuals On April 14th, Abbeville, Fontaine-sur-Somme, Mareuil-Caubert, Amiens, Cagny and Camon, taken altogether, counted 1.328 houses flooded out of on 2.422 listed in the whole department, and 700 inhabitants out of 937 were evacuated. On May 8th, Abbeville, Fontaine-sur-Somme, Mareuil-Caubert and Amiens added up 1.093 houses flooded and 847 persons were evacuated. In Fontaine-sur-Somme and Mareuil-Caubert, the evacuated population represented a significant part of the total population of the municipality. Overall, during the two months hundreds of inhabitants got evacuated. After the water descended, some of the dwellings became inappropriate for living. Fortunately, there were no human victims. In total, there were 200 000 flooded houses out of which 400 underwent the severe damage. According to the data of the Inquiry Commission , the average cost of the works per house would be between 100.000 and 150.000 francs. 32 houses were destroyed and then totally reconstructed. At the end of July, the total amount of the damage was estimated at 100 million Euro, that is more than 650 million francs. Independently of the financial damage, the inhabitants were affected by the prolonged evacuation from their houses, the uncertainty about the possibility to resettle them after water descent, fear of a new flood next autumn. Chart 3. Precipitation in three towns in the Somme valley from 1998 to present. Companies From the very beginning, there should be a clear differentiation between an indirectly suffered company and a flooded company - a direct victim of the flooding event. In case of the inundation at the Somme, the number of the indirectly suffered companies is much bigger than the number of the flooded companies. All the economy sectors of the Picardie department were touched by the disaster, i.e. the industry, business, craftsmen's and tourism. In Abbeville, the floods interrupted partially or totally the activity of around 50 companies. Without being physically touched, some companies underwent an indirect loss because of interruptions in deliveries, loss of access to the premises of the companies and other difficulties associated with the destruction of the roads. The difficulties are all the bigger as most of the companies insured their real estates and their materials but no provision has been made regarding stocks or operating losses. The tourism sector turned out to be the particularly sensitive to flooding. This sector in Picardie encompasses 2.800 companies with overall 9.000 employers. Around thirty establishments were flooded - campsites, hotels, etc. and a turnover drop was registered at the rate from 10 % to 35 %, partially because of unfavourable climatic conditions, but also due to the negative image produced by media. Agriculture The farmers incurred substantial damage during the inundation as of spring 2001 at the Somme as well. The assessment of the agricultural damages due to natural disasters established by the administration of the department in charge of agriculture and forest management remained provisional. According to its estimations, the losses incurred by the farmers were approximately 23 million francs, without account of the reconstruction works. The floodwaters mainly affected the natural pastures and hortillonnages (marshy land canalised of agricultural and aesthetic value) of Amiens. Twenty-five hectares of the hortillonnages of the region of Amiens were damaged. The degradation of hortillonnages, which are one of the attractions of the Picardie department, also affected the tourism sector. 4 farms in the region of Fontaine-sur-Somme must have been evacuated. The several months when the floods remained on the natural pastures destroyed winter crops, delayed spring plantations and degraded the structure of grounds. It is predicted that the land will reach its normal productivity in two or three years. The supply of cattle feed was assured only thanks to the solidarity/humanitarian aid of other departments, in particular the Bouches-du-Rhône and the Dordogne. Additional losses of 2,5 million francs were incurred by the market gardeners. As for agricultural crops in the areas outside the flooded zone, due to the over-saturation of the ground it was possible to plant them only starting from May that had its negative effect on the returns of the harvest. Public infrastructure The public equipment of the municipalities concerned was also greatly damaged. Quite a number of such public equipment objects like hunting huts, football grounds, camping sites etc. submerged. The losses incurred were often much superior than the annual budget of the municipalities. The municipal financial resources were not sufficient enough to restore the public equipment on their own. The degradation of such profitable objects as hunting huts put at risk the balance of the local finances. The public roads, especially those in the area of the ponds at the Haute-Somme River, turned out to be the most fragile during the slow flood event in April 2001. The railway line Amiens-Abbeville and the station of Abbeville were submerged, but the traffic of the regional express transport was restored in mid-May. The floods provoked exceptional erosion of banks but, thanks to the maintenance works, only one bridge over the channels of the Somme was damaged. However, if the situation had gone worse, than it really did the costs of restoration works could have amounted to 200 million francs. 3.2.2. The flooding event in the basin of the River Odra in summer 1997 Background information The Odra is the second largest river in Poland, regarding both its length (854 km, including 742 km belonging to Poland), and the area of its drainage basin (118 861 km2, including 106 056 km2 belonging to Poland). Only 6% of the Odra river basin area belong to Czech Republic and 5% - to Germany. The sources of the Odra river are located in Sudety Mountains in Czech Republic, and its mouth is in the Baltic Sea. 162 km of the river form the natural border between Poland and Germany. The major part of the Odra river basin consists of the lowland area (200 m above sea level). Mountains surround the south edge of the river basin. The average annual precipitation in the mountainous area constitutes 1000-1300 mm. In the major part of the Odra river basin, the average annual precipitation counts 500-600 mm. Usually, the rainfall of the Odra river basin differs between 500 and 600 mm. In the mountainous area, average rainfall differs from 1000 to 1300 mm. Poland is divided in 16 voievodships (region level). In January 1999, in Poland the reform of the public administration system started being implemented. According to it, 49 voievodships were transformed into 16. The majority of tasks, previously performed by Voievoda , has been handed to the new level of self-governments. In addition, the new level of administrative division - county (powiat) - was established. The lowest level of the administrative division is municipality (gmina). Overall, on the territory of Poland there are 308 counties, 58 cities with a county's rights, and 2 489 municipalities. Flood event in the River Odra basin, summer 1997 The flood of 1997 on the river Odra started in Czech Republic. High water levels exceeded norms during several weeks. The exceeding of historical absolute maximum water level persisted up to 16 days. The experts defined three rainstorms or consecutive stages, which formed the flood. During the first stage of the disaster, an intensive rainfall in the Upper Odra and its highland tributaries happened. The water level in the Upper Odra rose above the highest level ever recorded. For example, in 1997 at the Raciborz-Miedonia gauge the rainfall level of 1 045 cm and 3 260 m3 of discharge exceeded the historical recorded level of 838 cm and 1 630 m3, accordingly. Water levels exceeded the absolute historical maximum for 173 cm (777 cm in 1997, 604 cm in 1813, and 584 in 1985) and the peak flow reached 3 500 m3. During the first stage, the flood ruined the town Klodzko (31 000), located on the River Nysa Klodzka (an Odra tributary). The town faced already several dramatic floods. For example, in July 1310, a large flood inundated suburbs and killed between 1 500 to 2 000 people . In the second stage, a huge flood wave appeared in the river channel, and it propagated downstream, where it inundated low-lying towns. Since the wave was huge, it was not possible to avoid inundation of towns. Nevertheless, due to the time lag, some preparations could be made. The flood devastated such large towns as Raciborz (65 000 inhabitants), Opole (131 000) and Wroclaw (700 000). The flood protection system for Wroclaw was designed for a flow rate of 2 400 m3. The peak flow rate in July 1997 was higher by nearly half. The peak of the flood wave flattened while travelling downstream, and the return period of the maximum discharge was decreasing if going down. Chart 4. Water level in the Odra river during the flood in summer, 1997 Finally, in the third stage, high waters reached the boundary between Poland and Germany and further downstream the Lower Odra. At those sites, technicians had more time for heightening and strengthening embankments. Luckily, towns and lands on the Polish side were saved. For example, massive dikes with the height from 1.2m to 1.5m saved Slubice town from flooding. On the German side, damage of several embankments and significant material losses were recorded. Concerning the reasons of flood in summer 1997, the experts made the conclusion it was the result of exceptionally intensive precipitation, covering large areas. The 1997 flood was classified as a 500-year flood. The structural flood defence system of several larger towns on the Odra and its tributaries and for vast areas of agricultural land proved to be totally inadequate for flood protection. Flood defence systems proved to be designed for much smaller floods, that is why they were destroyed when exposed to much higher pressures Table 2. Summary of losses caused by the 1997 Odra flood in Poland The nation-wide toll for both the Odra and Vistula floods of summer 1997 was all-time high in Poland as far as economic losses are concerned. There is no official figure for material losses, but the estimations range from two to four billion US dollars, indicating significant cost to the national economy (see table 2). The number of fatalities reached 54. The number of evacuees was 162 000. Around 665 000 ha of land were flooded, of which 450 000 were agricultural. After inundating the town of Raciborz (65 000 inhabitants), the Odra river flooded other large towns located downstream, including Opole (131 000) and Wroclaw (700 000). In these cities, high material losses were unavoidable, because their flood protection systems had been designed for much lower flows. 3.3. Problem definition Taking into account the peculiarities of current systems of the flood control, preventive techniques and human activity in river valleys, the catastrophic consequences of the flood could not possibly be avoided. It means more effective flood control and preventive systems should be developed. It includes establishment of a comprehensive system of countrywide coverage to streamline and facilitate monitoring, forecasting and warning on dangerous natural phenomena, and collecting and dissemination of information on the current weather patterns. 3.3.1. Structural and non-structural anti-flood measures Throughout history, various societies dealt with floods as well as they could within the constraints of their wealth and technology. General strategies for coping with floods comprise learning to live with floods (without attempting to control flood magnitude or to protect the areas susceptible to flooding), protecting life, land and property, and reducing flood peaks and volumes. Specific measures employed in these strategies include structural and non-structural measures . A classification of flood management measures is shown on Figure 1. Figure 1. Classification of flood management measures Non-structural measures Non-structural measures comprise regulations and policies, flood defence and flood-insurance. These measures strive to reduce flood impacts, without altering flood characteristics, and as such, focus on policies and emergency measures with low capital investments. Essentially, these measures increase threshold flows, for which no damage occurs. Regulations control the human use of flood plains and inundation-prone lands. The implementation of these regulations in based on flood risk maps, which are essential tools for land use planning in flood-prone areas. These maps combine hydrological, geomorphologic, hydraulic, and land use information related to floods, and serve for assessing flood damages and the feasibility of non-structural control measures. Flood proofing regulations specify which structures may be built in flood-prone areas, and how they could be constructed or modified to withstand floods up to a certain frequency, without sustaining substantial damage. Flood defence measures include flood forecast, warning, and evacuation, and any other emergency measures implemented during floods. All of these measures are designed to minimise flood impacts. Flood forecast systems are used before and during floods to direct flood defence activities and emergency operations. Flood forecasts are used for issuing flood warnings. However, the success of such systems depends on people's response and co-operation. Warning systems collect information about an impending emergency, communicate it to those, who need it, and facilitate correct decisions and responses by those in danger. The management subsystem integrates and evaluates the risk information and warns the public. For effectiveness, people must receive the warning, understand and believe it. It mainly depends on the level of risk perception adequacy. Factors at play include sender factors (a familiar, credible, official source), and receiver factors (environmental, social, psychological aspects). The last but not the least non-structural measure discussed is a flood insurance, which is practised in many ways, ranging from public disaster relief to governmental or private insurance programs. A primary example of such programs is the U.S. national flood insurance program, which was created in 1968 and further modified by the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973. This program has played a critical role in fostering and accelerating the principles of flood plan management. Structural measures Structural measures aim to achieve two objectives: reduce flood volumes and peaks, and, thereby, protect people and property against flood damages. Numerous measures have been developed and classified into various categories, e.g., as point, linear and spatially distributed structures. The first two categories are also called the intensive measures, and the last category - the extensive structural measures. The extensive measures reduce flood generation potential and, typically, are implemented for a variety of reasons, not just for flood reduction. Extensive structural measures strive to delay runoff, increase infiltration, an minimise erosion by reshaping land surface (terracing, contour plowing) and implementing erosion protection (soil conservation, restoring vegetative cover, reforestation). Intensive flood management structures include storage facilities, enhancement of river bed conveyance capacity, and earthen platforms and polders in flood plains. Storage reservoirs store flood waters and release them when downstream capacity allows it. Well-size reservoirs can practically eliminate smaller and intermediate floods, and may reduce large floods. However, such protection is achieved at large environmental costs - loss of land to water storage space, loss of habitat, reduced biodiversity, loss of land regeneration in flood plains, and creation of a new risk associated with a potential dam failure. River bed flow capacity can be increased by embankments (levees), dikes, and flood walls. These measures protect land in upstream reaches from flooding, but by eliminating flood lain storage, they increase river discharge and may export flood problems downstream. During floods, embankments require protection (reinforcement, repairs, particularly after extended exposure to high water), and land behind embankments has to be drained by pumping. Other concerns arise from reduced low flows in the summer and a gradual build-up of river bed elevations in reaches with embankments. Through this process, river beds become super-elevated with respect to the surrounding land and may flood large areas when embankments fail. Other measures in this category include diversion channels/tunnels, which reduce flows in the protected river beds. Platforms and polders are earthen structures providing for flood protection of facilities located in floodplains. Because of this location, platforms and polders interfere with flood flow and may adversely impact the environment. Selection of flood management measures The selection of flood management measures is based either on the traditional benefit/cost analysis, or on multi-criterion ranking. In the benefit-cost analysis, benefits include reduction in costs of floodplain occupancy, reduced flood emergency measure costs, and improvements in flood plain land use. These benefits are compared with the cost of flood management measures. However, economic evaluation is not a perfect tool because of its limits, uncertainties and poor consideration or neglect of environmental and social aspects. It should be emphasised that the successful flood mitigation schemes are likely to include a mixture of various measures, carefully selected to meet the water management needs of a particular river bed and the entire catchment. In some areas, the "do nothing" alternative may be the preferred choice, causing the least interference with local ecosystems. Somewhat similar goals can be achieved with non-structural measures serving to increase the flow limit for which no damages occur. Proactive conservation measures, reducing runoff and erosion over large parts of the river catchment, are going on prominence in the contemporary land use planning and may be required to compensate for the ongoing land development. Finally, intensive structural measures may have their place in multipurpose projects with low environmental impacts. The traditional technical anti-flood measures have turned out to be inefficient to protect the population from the flood. Especially, it became clear after the analysis of the results of French case study. Traditionally, in France more attention has been paid to structural measures of flood management (embankments, dikes, dams, polders, and flood plains). However, the mentioned measures are not always relevant and efficient. More emphasis should be put onto non-technical (social and institutional) measures to be taken to prevent or reduce the risk of flood hazards. 3.3.2. The definition of the main problems After the flood of 1997 in Poland, considerable investments aimed at improvement of flood preparedness systems, including strengthening the flood forecasting and warning systems (e.g., the wide use of modern technologies, radars, GISs) have been done. Efforts have been made to upgrade the monitoring systems, to render stream-gauges more robust, and to make communication and data transmission systems more reliable than during the 1997 floods. At the same time, experts express an opinion many losses of human lives could have been avoided in 1997, if the flood warning would have reached these people and/or if they would have believed this warning and reacted to it. Many fatalities were caused by partial (local) failure of the warning/information systems or by the ignorance of the severity of the flood danger. In order to deal more effectively with a flood problem the following tasks should be performed in Poland. Legislative measures. It is necessary to adopt a new law, which describes an emergency state in case of floods and measures to be taken. Administrative measures. Flood management strategy, that includes measures for modernisation of technical infrastructures (embankments, dikes, dams, polders, and flood plains) and non-structural flood protection measures should be worked out. The flood management strategy should maintain every step of the chain of operational flood management "observation - forecast - response - recovery" on the base of both technical and skills related measures . Technical measures. New effective meteorological radar system, which would provide warning about intensive precipitation, should be established. Digital maps of towns and villages should be prepared and used during floods to forecast the extent of flooded areas and to guide evacuation. Social measures. The society, as well as the media, should be educated how to deal with floods, which anti-flood measures should be taken by every individual, which areas are safe to live, what are the insurance system benefits, how to co-operate with local people (authorities) in flood emergency etc. If analysing the Somme river flood event, the following problems seem to be obstacles for better management of floods: - enterprises, companies, householders have low incentive to prevent risk of floods; - indifference of insurance companies providing flood insurance; - low responsibility of the insured stakeholders in the case of flood coming etc. - the memory of risk is very low, that is reflected in the unadjusted insurance procedures, low consciousness of local population, local authorities, who do not take seriously prognosis about coming floods or other natural hazards. Having briefly analysed French and Polish practices regarding flood, the following general conclusions could be made: - technical measures taken are not always workable and satisfactory; - both countries suffer from the lack of co-ordination in floods dealing and shortcomings in insurance system. An the same time, in Poland the situation is worse in all the scale of problems. In spite of a variety of implemented technical measures, people in Europe continue to suffer from floods, and the economies and environmental surrounding continue to incur losses. It happens mainly due to long-time underestimation of non-structural measures, like adequate risk perception forming, implementation and development of effective financial instruments (insurance), and creation of smooth and acting system of co-ordination and collaboration between responsible authorities. Further, the paper will analyse non-technical flood measures in the fields of legislation, finance and social sector. It is assumed, the following non-technical measures should be taken in order to favour effective public policy associated to floods: - legislative support of the measures (administrative regulation, co-ordination of bodies who manage related to floods issues); - financial support (provision of the appropriate insurance schemes and mechanisms for their effective elaboration); - social (realistic risk perception, education, adequate memory of risk, propaganda of insurance schemes, solidarity between citizens, local and regional governments in cases of floods). Based on the results of the experts surveys, literature database and other materials, and after the analysis of public policy associated to flood events in Europe, it was decided the following three main problems should be analysed. 1. Inadequate risk perception of concerned local citizens and experts. 2. Poor co-ordination and scattered organisation of the flood management in Europe. 3. Shortcomings of financial instruments (insurance system), particularly, the absence of incentive for people to get flood insurance. 3.4. Conclusions In the present Chapter, two case studies in France and Poland have been briefly analysed to find the best non-technical anti-flood measures to be implemented for slow floods prevention and mitigation. Structural and non-structural measures have been presented as the different approaches to flood management. As it has been mentioned the traditional technical anti-flood measures have turned out to be inefficient to protect the population from the flood. Therefore, they are left out of the scope of the present paper. The importance of non-structural measures is emphasised and their implementation is recommended further in the paper. The non-structural measures are to cover the following three main problems existing in flood management. The problems mentioned will be the topic of the Chapters 4-6: - Poor co-ordination and scattered organisation of the flood management in Europe; - Socially attenuated risk perception of the slow flood hazard; - Shortcomings of financial instruments, particularly, the deficiencies in insurance system. The measures will be proposed and evaluated after every mentioned Chapter. 4. Problem analysis - deficiencies in flood management administrative structure of France and Poland. 4.1. Introduction In this Chapter, the flood management administrative structure in France, Poland and on the European level will be profoundly described and analysed in sections 4.2. - 4.4. The aim of the present Chapter is to find possibilities for better legislation and a better administrative structure, regarding flood management in Europe. Therefore, the measures to ameliorate the deficiencies in flood management structure of above mentioned countries will be proposed in section 4.6. One of the non-structural measures of flood management is regulation. Appropriate regulations on building requirements, hydraulic structures in flood-prone areas will prevent catastrophes if a flood occurs. In Poland and in France, it was found that there are a lot of regulations on flood management. Every city and every municipality has their own legislation and rules on what to do when a flood occurs. Especially cities, villages and regions with a good memory of flood risk, often have the best measures taken against the risk of a flood. But some areas where a flood did not occur for a long time sometimes lack proper legislation. Proper legislation on a higher level might overcome this problem of areas being not prepared for floods. For instance, it is known that good legislation controlling the human use of flood-plains should be based upon proper flood risk maps, which are essential tools for land use planning in flood-prone areas. And it is known that the effectiveness of these regulations is only as good as their enforcement in land use planning. Weak or inconsistent enforcement seriously undermines the effectiveness of these non-structural measures. So, consistent regulations based on proper risk-maps is a good non-structural measure against the risk of floods. For consistent regulation one might expect clear legislation about anti-flood measures and risk maps on the central level in France, Poland and also in Brussels. During the present research it was found, however, that the role of the national government on floods prevention and protection is limited both in France and Poland. On the European level there is hardly any legislation on floods. In Brussels, they have in the Directorate General (DG) Environment good risk maps about forest fires which prove to be very helpful for diminishing the risk of those fires. But on floods there are no such maps. Also, in Poland and in France, there is no consistency on the use of these risk maps. Some municipalities know about the existence of these maps and some do not. Some organisations use these maps and some do not. For instance, in Poland the WWF said during the interview that they made nice risk maps for the Odra river, while another governmental organisation mentioned that they already have these maps somewhere and complains that nobody uses them. In this Chapter, it will be proved that legislation and the administrative structure is not so clear in both Poland and France. Questions about who is responsible for what keep arising after each flood event and no consistent legislation exists in the two countries, for example, regarding the use of risk maps. The administrative structure of water management differs between the two countries in general. Mostert distinguishes the hydrological, the administrative and the co-ordinated model. According to the hydrological model, the organisational structure for water management is based on hydrological boundaries and extensive river basin planning. In its most extreme form, the whole water management is in one hand: the 'river basin authority'. The administrative model is, in many respects, the opposite of the hydrological one. According to this model, river basin management is a part of environmental management, conducted by regional and local authorities, such as provinces and municipalities. The co-ordinated model falls somewhere between the hydrological and the administrative model. One of its main features is that, although water management is not performed by a 'real' river basin authority, co-ordination of relevant policies is otherwise guaranteed at the river basin level. Water management in general is not only determined by its formal structure. That fact also counts for flood management in France and Poland. In this informal structure, a lot of actors interact with each other without being ruled by law. The actors are, for instance, the general public, NGOs, the press, farmers, businesses. Because of the importance of the informal interactions, it can be mentioned that the result of these informal interactions are very important in flood management in France and Poland. Because of the rather low political profile of flood management and the technical expertise required, most flood management policy is in practice formulated by local public officials in consultation with environmental NGOs. Public participation in some form has also become an accepted norm of administrative decision making. Public participation is an essential component of good government. Members of the public can make relevant facts available to decision makers and also allow them to view issues from different perspectives. If the public officials are attentive, better decisions should be the result. Public participation also has a desirable tendency to open up governmental decision making to public scrutiny. The public in general becomes better informed about how decisions are made in the real world and about what factors actually motivate bureaucratic policy makers. Finally, broad public participation tends to produce a better record for judicial review. 4.2. Flood management in France In France, the role of the state is mainly to identify the risks and to communicate them to the local authorities. Another important role of the state regarding floods is the planning of the land. The state has to identify which grounds can be occupied by different sorts of activities. The state is in charge of preparation of risks prevention plans (le plan de prevention des risques des inondations - PPRI). In France, the water policy is defined by the State, in partnership with all local communities and users - industrialists, large regional developers, farmers, suppliers, fishermen and fish farmers, associations for the protection of nature - associated at every level, with a view to organize a global management of the resource, so as to ensure the optimal satisfaction of all requirements, while respecting aquatic ecosystems. The management of surface and ground water in France is based on six important fundamental principles : ; The geographic reality of large river basins must be taken into account as " water knows no administrative boundary "; ; An integrated approach to meet all water use requirements while respecting aquatic ecosystems; ; Establishing partnerships and co-ordinating the actions of public authorities and developers : this is the role of the 6 river basin committees and of the Prefects, basin co-ordinators. It is the purpose of Masterplans and Schemes for Water Development and Management (SDAGE and SAGE); ; Mobilizing specific financial resources is the task of the six Water Agencies. The users-polluters have to pay as " water must pay for water "; ; A multiannual planning which defines priority investments within the framework of river leasing contracts and the Water Agencies' VIth programme; ; The respect of the competence of each private or public contracting authority in its specific sphere, within the collective framework defined by law. Furthermore, the French national territory has been divided into six large " river basins ": 1. from the Adour to the Garonne, 2. from Artois to Picardy, 3. from the Loire to Brittany, 4. from the Rhine to the Meuse, 5. from the Rhone to the Mediterranean Sea and Corsica, 6. from the Seine to Normandy. In the French water management system the water resources are managed at 3 levels 1. National level: The National Water Committee, chaired by a member of Parliament, is composed of representatives of the National Assembly and the Senate, and of important institutions and national federations involved. It is consulted on the trends of the national water policy and on drafts of legislative and regulatory texts. 2. The level of each of the six large river basins: The River Basin Committee, chaired by a local elected official, plays a fundamental role as regards trends and incentives: After consulting Regional, General and Local Councils, it prepares and adopts the Masterplan for Water Development and Management (SDAGE) which fixes for each basin or group of basins, the fundamental trends for a balanced, quantitative and qualitative water management. SDAGEs takes into account the main programmes decided by public communities and defines, in a general and harmonious manner, the objectives for water quantity and quality as well as the developments and improvements to be undertaken to attain them. They define the limits of the sub-basins corresponding to hydrographic units. The River Basin Committee is consulted by the Water Agency, set up in the river basin, on the rates and bases of water charges levied for water withdrawals and discharges. It is also consulted on the priorities for the Agency's 5-year action programmes and on the methods to aid investments and the smooth running of private and public wastewater treatment plants. 3. At the level of tributaries and sub-basins corresponding to a hydrographic unit or an aquifer: A Local Water Commission can be set up to prepare and follow up the implementation of the Water Development and Management Scheme (SAGE). It is composed by one half of representatives of local communities, by one quarter of representatives of users and by one quarter of State representatives. The SAGE fixes the general objectives for the utilization, development and quantitative and qualitative protection of surface and groundwater resources, and aquatic ecosystems, as well as for the preservation of wetlands, in a manner which complies with the principles defined by law. Its area is determined by the Masterplan. When no Masterplan exists, the State representative will make the decision after consulting or retaining proposals of local communities and the River Basin Committee. When the scheme has been approved, the decisions made by administrative authorities in the field of water, and applicable to the area it defines, must be consistent or made consistent with this scheme. The local communities involved, can associate themselves with a Local Water Community to help attain the objectives determined by the Water Development and Management Scheme. The " Local Water Community " can be entrusted with the study, the completion and operation of all constructions, installations or equipment of an urgent or general character, aiming at : ; developing a basin or part of a hydrographic basin, ; developing and maintaining a watercourse that is not managed by the State, including accesses, ; water supply, ; controlling storm water and run-off, ; protecting against floods and the sea, ; controlling pollution, ; protecting and preserving surface and groundwater, ; protecting and restoring sites, aquatic ecosystems and wetlands as well as bordering woodlands, ; developing hydraulic works for civil defence. In Paris, the International Water Office is located. This is an association network with lots of different kind of partners. These include all French ministries dealing with water affairs, industry, the six water agencies, all recharge and planing centres, municipalities, private firms and some foreign partners. Their purpose is to facilitate co-operation between different organisations to help them to exchange information, mainly in the field of professional planing information system. The organisation has a great library and French water data base with which they can co-operate with other European governmental agencies to develop exchange of data between European countries and new candidates. One of the missions of the International Water Office is to help developing countries to reform their administration and to set up capacity to build new institutions. 4.3. Flood management in Poland. Rational utilisation and protection of water resources are sanctioned in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. The most important legal regulations in compliance with this entry are legal standards specifying: ; The utilisation principles of water resources (Law of 1974: Water Law Act), ; The use of the environment (Laws of 1980: The Environment Protection and Shaping Act, and of 1991: The Environment Inspection Act), ; Problems related to town and country planning (Law 1994: The Land Development Act), ; The tasks performed by the local governments and the state agencies (Laws of 1990 and 1998: The Local Government and Assignment of Competence and Tasks to the Community and Government Administrative Bodies Act. The main targets of water management in Poland are: ; improving the purity level of surface and underground waters, ; Securing the required amounts of good quality water, with proper level of assurance, to both people and the national economy, ; Reducing the amount of flood destruction and damage caused by the water as an element, ; Limitation of bottom and bank erosion in river beds, and safe operation of hydrotechnical facilities, ; Providing the conditions for utilisation of water resources in power industry, navigation, and for recreational purposes. The main administrative organ dealing with water management is the Ministry of the Environment. The most important institutions responsible for the management of water resources in the hydrographic areas, are the Regional Water Development Authorities (RZGWs). The RZGWs are regional non-affiliated governmental administration organs and execute the ordinances of the Minister of the Environment on water management issues. Poland has been dived into 7 water management regions. The RZGWs are organisational units set up to perform different tasks concerning water management, among others, flood management. The 7 regions are: 1. The RZGW, seated in Gdansk; their operation territory covers the Vistula River basin from Korabniki to the mouth at the sea; 2. The RZGW, seated in Gliwice; their operation territory covers the basin of the Vistula River from the sources to the mouth of the Premsza River and the basin of the Odra River within the national territory of Kedzierzyn-Kozle; 3. The RZGW, seated in Cracow; their operation territory covers the basin of the Vistula River from the mouth of the Przemsza River to the mouth of the Sanna River; 4. The RZGW, seated in Poznan; their operation territory covers the basin of the Warta River from the sources to the mouth of the Odra River; 5. The RZGW, seated in Szczecin; their operation territory covers the basin of the Odra River to the mouth of the Nysa Luzycka to the mouth at the sea, excluded the basin of the Warta River and the basin of the west littoral rivers; 6. The RZGW, seated in Warszawa; their operation territory covers the basin of the Vistula from the mouth of the Sanna River to Korabniki; 7. The RZGW, seated in Wroclaw; their operation territory covers the basin of the Odra River from Kedzierzyn-Kozle to the mouth of the Nysa Luzycka. The 1997 event made the public at large aware of how dangerous and destructive a flood can be. It also demonstrated the weak elements of the defense system and helped identify the most pressing needs for improvements. The structural flood defense system, for several larger towns upon the Odra and its tributaries as well as for vast areas of agricultural land, proved to be totally inadequate for such rare flood. Flood defences designed for smaller, more common floods, were bound to fail when exposed to much higher pressures . After the flood of 1997, there have been considerable investments in Poland, aimed at improvement of flood preparedness systems, including strengthening the flood forecasting and warning systems (e.g. the wider use of modern technology, radar, GIS). Efforts have been made to upgrade the monitoring systems, to render stream-gauges more robust, and to make communication and data transmission systems more reliable than during the 1997 floods. Since January 1999, Poland has implemented a comprehensive reform of the public administration by decentralising public services and finances to two new levels of self-government: powiats (counties) and voivodships (regions or provinces). In addition, the government administration in the voivodship has been deeply reshaped. Most of the tasks previously undertaken by the Voivoda (the representative of the Council of Ministers in the voivodship) have been shifted to the new levels of self-governments. The decentralisation of public services and finances to local self-governments is placing great demands on public administrators, especially in rural areas. Councillors and board members in rural areas often do not have the necessary organisational and managerial skills. There are new functions to administer and new processes to apply. Moreover, local and regional administrators have insufficient capacity to implement EU pre-accession adjustments, therefore, affecting the possibility for rural areas to absorb EU pre-accession and structural funds. In February 2000, the Minister of the Environment established the office of Water Management. The activity of the Office is aimed at harmonising the operation of the RZGW's and providing assistance in organising actions targeted at the rational use, preservation and protection of water resources. The administration of the state-owned surface waters, not administered by the RZGWs, is divided between the Provincial Boards of Land Improvement and Water Facilities, which are subject to the provincial governments and the Agency of State Farmlands. In addition, the National Parks administer waters located in their territory and the State Forestry Enterprise administers certain water areas situated within their forest zones. The management system of water resources comprises both the central and local government administrative bodies. The planning, executive and investment tasks are subject to the local governments of all levels - of the province, district and community. The instruments that enable to perform those tasks are, among others, the strategy of provincial development, provincial programmes of balanced development and environmental protection, and principally, the local town and country plans worked out by and in the communities. Given the current condition of the flood control and prevention system and developments in river valleys, the catastrophic consequences of the flood could not possibly be avoided. Damage repairs had to start and more effective flood control and prevention system needed to be developed. The World Bank offered its assistance and sent a Mission to Poland in September 1997. By November 1997, the Mission prepared principal assumptions behind the US million loan project to finance these operations. The Emergency Flood Recovery Project was developed, including three components; ; Component A - repair of municipal and rural infrastructure; ; Component B - flood management and hazard reduction; ; Component C - project administration and assistance (establishment of the project co-ordination unit). Four sub-components of Component B were identified, i.e. ; B1 - basin flood management planning, ; B2 - hydrological and meteorological monitoring, forecasting and protection system and warning, ; B3 - flood protection infrastructure (financed by the European Investment Bank), ; B4 - flood risk mitigation and response. In Poland, there are NGOs active in the field of flood management. An NGO interviewed during research trip to Poland was the WWF in Warsaw. The main goal of the WWF in Poland is to protect nature. WWF in Poland uses the flood-issue for achieving that goal. WWF promotes a very important (non-technical) anti-flood measure, namely, to let the river flow freely in its own river basin. The main argument the WWF uses is that it is an effective anti-flood measure. And by promoting this the organisation tries to achieve its own goal, to conserve the river basin. The WWF achieved a lot in Poland. It is the organisation that brought parties together on (international) seminars, which where organised by the WWF. A lot of specialists in Poland remember these seminars and found them very useful because it gave them the opportunity to exchange information with colleagues from different disciplines and different places. One very important thing which the WWF has done is the preparation of a risk atlas of the Odra river. A very interesting detail is that the preparation of this atlas was financed by GELIN, a German insurance company. The WWF is campaigning for the increase of non-structural and non-technical anti-flood measures. They argue that dikes and reservoirs are not enough. The WWF has calculated that the natural flood-plain area in the two big rivers of Poland has decreased. The organisation also argues that in places where there is enough space for the river to inundate, people in these areas have a good understanding about those natural occurring floods. 4.4. Flood management in Europe 4.4.1. EU legislation EU legislation takes precedence over national legislation in the member states. In general, there are two types of legislation (interdependent): Primary legislation - Treaties and agreements with similar status that is agreed in direct negotiation between member state governments. They are subject to the ratification by national parliaments. These treaties also define the role and responsibilities of the EU institutions and bodies involved in decision-making processes, legislative, executive and juridical procedures of Community law and its implementation. This is also the case for any amendments. Examples include the Single European Act (1987), the Treaty on European Union - "Maastricht Treaty" (1992), and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). Secondary legislation - This is based on treaties and can take different forms: ; Regulations which are directly applicable and binding in all member states without the need for any nation legislation to implement them. ; Directives - binding upon member states as to the objectives to be achieved within a certain time-limit while leaving national authorities the choice of form and means to be used. They have to be implemented into the national law of each member state. ; Decisions - binding in all aspects on those to whom they are addressed. They do not require national legislation to implement them. They can be addressed to any or all member states, enterprises or even to individuals. ; Recommendations and opinions - these are not binding. Because of its right of initiative, the Commission is charged with making proposals for all new legislation. Issuing communications, which include relevant reflections, questions and/or proposals for action, may do this. The Council may also adopt conclusions of a political nature or other types of acts such as Declarations or Resolutions. On 2nd of March 1987, the Council of Europe adopted a resolution, an open partial agreement, which is called the Eur-opa major hazards agreement. The European Commission, UNESCO, WHO and the Office for Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) of the United Nations participated in the Agreement. Also, the international federation of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies were associated in its work. The main objectives of this agreement were: ; Reinforce and promote co-operation between member states in a multidisciplinary context to ensure better prevention, protection and organisation of relief in the event of major natural or technological disasters by calling upon present day resources and knowledge to ensure an efficient and interdependent management of major disasters ; Use the Agreement as a suitable platform for co-operation between Eastern Europe, the South of the Mediterranean and Western Europe in the field of major natural and technological disasters. ; Ensure a direct interest and participation of the member states by fostering the creation of European Centres. These structures facilitate the implementation of the objectives of the Agreement and the different partners, through European information, training, research and expertise programmes. The activities were performed at three levels: ; The political level where the policy of the agreement, the co-operation programmes and the budgetary proposals are decided through meetings of: ; The ministers of the agreement; ; The committee of permanent correspondents; ; The programme sub-committee; ; The audit sub committee. ; Scientific and technical permanent activities: ; The European warning System; ; The European advisory evaluation committee for earthquake prediction; ; The European network of specialised centres (21 centres). ; Specific programmes ; The communication and information programme EDRIM (Electronic discussion group for risk management) ; ; The use of space technology to assist risk management (the STRIM Programme); ; The Euro Mediterranean programme on training in the field of risk sciences (the FORM-OSE programme. 4.4.2. EU Water legislation The influence of international bodies on national water management has increased significantly. This is mainly caused by the growing concern on the water quality. Water legislation was one of the first sectors to be covered by the EU environmental policy. The first legislation's dated from the 1970's and resulted in several directives. These directives were mainly based on the first Environmental Action Programme (1973). However, all the legislation that has ever been on the European level mainly dealt with the quality of water. Examples are the Surface Water Directive 75/440/EEC, the Fish Water Directive 78/659/EEC and the Shellfish Water Directive. These three directives require environmental quality standards to be established for specific water bodies and water uses. Another important directive is the Dangerous Substances Directive 76/464/EEC and the Groundwater Directive 80/86/EEC. The 1976 Directive is an important component of EU water legislation and provides the framework for subsequent regulation to control the discharge of specific dangerous substances. In a similar way, the groundwater directive tries to control the number of substances flowing into groundwaters. One of the biggest problems of EU water policy in general is not insufficient legislation, but the fact that basically no directive has been completely implemented and applied by the member states. Nine member states were found guilty by the European Court of Justice for non-compliance with water legislation. 4.4.3. Directorate General XII and RIPARIUS The RIPARIUS (Risk of Inundation Planning and Response Interactive User System) Concerted Action was funded by the European Commission (EC) Directorate General XII, telecommunications, Information Market and Exploitation of Research, under the Environmental Sector (Area E, Program Support Actions) of the Telematics Application Program (TAP) which was part of the European Union Fourth Framework Program. The project duration was nominally 2 years (01 July 1998 to 30 May 2000). The objectives of RIPARIUS were to identify where and how communication of flood information can be best applied to help reduce flood losses. RIPARIUS concluded amongst other things that "risk should form the framework for managing and communicating the effects of flooding to river managers and to the public"; By improving the communication of information during the main tasks of flood preparedness, flood prediction warning, and response in case of flood events, it is expected that the impact of individual events can be reduced, in both human and economic terms. Whilst climatic and physical differences are great, the affects of different cultural attitudes and local organisational arrangements were found to be equally important. It became clear that climatic differences had an important influence on the priorities of different regions in relation to flooding. For example, Scandinavian countries were concerned with snow-melt and reservoir management whilst in Mediterranean countries, flash flooding was probably of the greatest priority. Whilst these observations were clearly simplifications of the complex range of issues present in each region, they did serve to illustrate the fact that no approach towards flood mitigation was likely to be easily applicable throughout the EU. The only requirement common to all countries was the need for better public awareness of flooding, how to prepare for and react to a flood situation. It is clear from the series of RIPARIUS project meetings and workshops held in a number of different countries, that many of the authorities involved in the management of river floods are only just starting to come to terms with a need to establish a dialogue with the general public. In some cases, possibly because of the political structure at the local level, there is the feeling that the public should not have access to much of the available data, such as flood risk maps. An important recommendation of RIPARUS is that the extent of possible flooding should no longer be depicted by a single reference level, but at least 3 lines should be used to depict floods of differing frequency, such as the 50, 100 and 200 year flood events. This should help to convey the concept of reducing flooding risk with increasing distance from the watercourse. There should also be a clear indication that there is still some chance of flooding in areas lying beyond the depicted envelopes. 4.4.4. Directorate General XI Environment Within the European Commission DG Environment, there is a Policy group B, called Environmental Quality of Natural Resources. The mission statement of this Group states that it tries to identify the major threats to the EU territory (natural, industrial, environmental), and to make the public aware of these risks and, ultimately, to protect the citizens and the environment from these risks. Within policy group B, there are two groups that could be responsible for flood on the European level, namely, B1 Water, Marine & Soil and B4 Civil Protection & Environmental Accidents. The Unit B1 is responsible for all water legislation in Europe. It is the unit which is responsible for the EU Water Framework Directive. The Unit B1 used to be responsible for flood management, but it is not anymore. The commission tells that it has been debated on a political level a lot of times whether to put the flood issue in the directive. In the end, they decided to leave it out, because they saw it more as a research and technology issue than an issue for their unit. The goal of the Unit Civil Protection (B4) is to develop measures to increase the protection of the citizens, the environment and property, to identify the major risks as well as prevent natural, technological or environmental disasters, and mitigate their consequences in case of land or sea accidents. The Unit can not intervene with member states. The only thing it can do is to propose some hints how to change national legislation, or how to construct the houses. So, there is no co-ordination on the European level. It is decided that the civil protection matter is in the competence of the national states and is difficult to co-ordinate it on the European level. Furthermore, it was decided on the European level that the protection from hazards is under the authority of the ministries of environment of the member states. The unit started on the 19th of March 2002 (the day of the interview) to prepare a paper on floods in Europe. This paper should include maps with high risk flood areas. The Unit considers that as very useful because the information from this research can be transposed all over Europe. Just recently, the European Space Agency launched ENVISA (see fig. 2), an advanced polar-orbiting Earth observation satellite which will provide measurements of the atmosphere, ocean, land, and ice over a five year period. The ENVISAT satellite has an ambitious and innovative payload that will ensure the continuity of the data measurements of the ESA ERS satellites. The ENVISAT data will support Earth science research and allow monitoring of the evolution of environmental and climatic changes. Furthermore, they will facilitate the development of operational and commercial applications. For flood protection this satellite can prove to be very useful because it can look at water levels even under the ground. Data from the satellite can be used in the future even for research on better flood risk maps. In America, the Association of State Floodplain Managers is already sponsoring a research on new ways of flood risk mapping. This research proposes to develop a technique for rapid annual updates of floodplain hazard maps using stage-based flood-frequency analysis, high-resolution digital topography, and GIS. 4.4.5. EU Water directive Recently the European Commission put into work the new EU Water Framework Directive, which is meant to replace most of the existing directives relating to water. The aims of the proposed directive are: ; To offer an integrated framework for EU water policy, ; To harmonise river basin management at member state level, ; To improve the protection of surface and groundwater. The framework directive is explicitly based on the river basin approach and mainly concerned with the quality of water. A very important reason for this is that the Council does not approve that Europe will gain power over the quantity of water. And since flood measures are dealing with the quantity of water, the Council does not want further legislation about this on the European level. For instance, Spain is right now building a great water network with the purpose of transposing water from a wet to a dry area. Spain sees nothing in regulations concerning the transpose and the quantities of water. The river basin approach requires member states to identify their river basins and assign them to so-called "river basin districts". For each river basin district, member states have to set up appropriate administrative structures. The function of these structures is to co-ordinate and oversee the implementation of the directive in each respective district. Member states are required to ensure that the River Basin Management Plans cover, among others, the following elements: ; ?A general description of the characteristics of the River Basin District, i.e. maps of the location and boundaries of water bodies (surface and groundwater), the eco-regions and surface water body types found in the river basin. Reference conditions for the surface water body types encountered should also be included. ; A summary of significant pressures and impact of human activity on the status of surface water and groundwater, including an estimation of point and diffuse source pollution and a summary of land use. ; Protected areas are to be identified and shown in map form. EU and accession countries The implementation of the Community's environmental legislation will be the main task for the candidate countries, supported by Community funding programmes. The candidate countries have the opportunity to make progress towards an economic development that is sustainable and avoid the type or scale of environmental problems now faced in Western Europe. Accession candidate countries must have all environmental legislation implemented at the date of their accession. Nevertheless, accession countries are asking for transposition periods, which are under negotiation. In the case of water legislation, accession countries have asked for transition periods for all the directives. 4.5. Conclusions France and Poland, but also the EU, have a wide range of non-structural measures at their disposal to mitigate the risk of flood, under which the proper legislation. But like other non-structural measures, legislation is poorly represented in both countries as well as in the EU. So, regulation as a non-structural anti-flood measure is very important and should be consistent. To be consistent, however, there should be clear legislation about this on the level of the state and even on the European level. It should also be clear in every country in Europe but also in Brussels what organisation is responsible for what regarding flood management. In other words, the administrative structure should be clear as well. The main argument for this is that if the administrative structure and the responsibilities are not clear, this leads to the loosing of responsibility and, finally, no responsibility. Governments in France and Poland should provide leadership and assistance in developing a comprehensive multi-level hierarchical flood management plan where responsibility and authority of each participant in flood mitigation is clarified. All these actions should be based on proper flood risk maps. The basic difference between France and Poland is the difference concerning available financial resources in both countries. Another important difference is the level of society. Poland, the last forty years, was under the Soviet regime. People saw the state as the organisation which could solve every problem. Therefore, people lost the abilities of coping with difficult situations. And flood is such a very difficult situation. Another big difference is the density of settlements in flood plains in Poland and France. In Poland, these are small compared to France. So, the natural conditions for good flood management in Poland are much better. The International Water Office in France has been co-operating with Poland for 10 years to help the country to implement a new river basin management system according to the new EU Water Framework Directive. Because this implementation was a bit difficult for Poland they decided to develop a new national water law. But during the ten years of cooperation, every two years the government collapsed. So, every two years they had to start all over again. Another problem in Poland is that there are many different bodies in charge of the same place with similar responsibilities. The new Polish water law has not changed very much. So, still there is no clear responsibility for flood management. Responsible bodies differ per location. On the state level, sometimes it is the ministry of spatial planning, sometimes, when the river flows through agricultural land, the ministry of agriculture, and sometimes the ministry of environment is responsible for the river. On the regional level, there is also a big confusion on the flood management responsibilities. Sometimes, the river basin management is under the responsibility of the regional board of water management, and, sometimes, the regional board of irrigation. Locally, different municipalities are responsible for their part of the river. In Poland, there are a lot of anti-flood projects. But the problem is that these projects all work independently. There is no co-ordination of these projects. For instance, the meteorological institute has made some risk maps but no specialist in flood management in Poland knows about the existence of these maps. It was revealed during the interviews that quite often the water officials did not know their colleagues working in flood management field and interviewed by the research team before. This lack of co-ordination can result in big problems in Poland if a big flood occurs again. Some regions are preparing nice dikes, water channels, reservoirs with money from, for instance, the World Bank. So, those regions are very well prepared. A good example of this is the municipality of Raciborz. But it is well known that when you build dikes upstream, the problems downstream will be even worse if a flood occurs. Poland co-operates very well on the issue of water management, but the money from the EU mainly goes to water treatment plants. The EU does not spend much on the prevention of floods in Poland. So, concerning flood management the co-operation with the EU is poor. Flood protection in France is the responsibility of the state and the regional departments. However, the state passes most of the responsibility to the local communities. These local communities realise that one of the best prevention methods against floods is not to build houses in flood-prone areas. But risk maps still do not exist for the whole France. The International Water Office admits that a lot of areas still have not been covered with risk maps . They even rediscovered recently some 'new areas' which have been flooded 20 years ago. But the Water Office official says that they are busy preparing the risk maps for all territories in France, but that it will take years to finish . A big problem with anti-flood legislation in France is that a lot of parties are involved. Especially making new legislation which forces people and companies to move from certain areas has a lot of resistance. The government has the possibility to force people to leave a certain area, but passed experiences show that this only works if the population living in that area is very small. The main reason for this is the costs that are involved in this process. In France, local authorities are very well prepared. All public services have a lot of good evacuation plans and they work more or less. A big problem raised after the flooding of the river Somme is the question of responsibility after the flood. In the case of the flooding event of the Somme river, people that suffered from the damage after the flood could apply for money from all different kinds of institutions and organisations. There was a local donation fund, a national donation fund, the municipality, the state and, in some cases, private insurance. It might be clear that proper legislation in this case on a state level could prove to be very helpful to avoid these responsibility questions. Very striking in the French flood management system is that the French system absolutely lacks non-technical measures. Most of the organisations visited knew nothing about the existence of special anti-flood educational programmes in schools, for instance. Also, the non-structural measures are lacking very much. A first step towards a consistent flood management in Europe will be that all countries in the EU have similar institutions responsible for the same things. In Europe, the main thing is to send a strong message that people are responsible to protect themselves to a certain degree. But that degree should be made clear, not only on the European level but also on the level of the member states since the big problem after floods still is: who is responsible for what damage? Another thing is that on the European level there should be clear legislation about warning systems and alerting procedures. Still not all countries have a statutory duty to warn in emergency situation. It is important that all European governments reach a conclusion as to whether or not they wish particular agencies to provide public warnings. If so, they should pass the appropriate legislation requiring them to do so, and make necessary financial provision available to them. By continuing doing nothing they will leave a vacuum between public expectation and public provision. The great gap in flood management policy on the European level is that there is no consistency. It takes a lot of energy and money spent. But the problem is that one cannot make legislation because it will not be approved by the Council. Furthermore, it will be difficult to make good legislation because the conditions in all the different countries are different. 4.6. Measures In this section, some possible measures will be presented that will result in better flood mitigation in France, Poland and Europe. The measures proposed are divided into regulatory instruments, social instruments, and organisational changes. The most important criteria of the measures to be adequate are the following: ; public and political acceptance, ; economic efficiency, ; administrative feasibility. 4.6.1. Regulatory instruments Regarding flood, the society has to learn living with the environment rather than trying to control it. Flood mitigation programs should be based on the distribution analysis of the risks and the benefits and costs associated with the selection or implementation of risk management strategies. Flood mitigation programs should include regulation, positive and negative economic incentives, and other ways to encourage behavioural changes to reduce risks. Flood mitigation programs should be looked at in the context of prevention programs and account for a broad range of relevant social and economic considerations, such as equity, quality of life, individual preferences, and the magnitude and distribution of benefits and costs (both direct and indirect, both quantifiable and non-quantifiable). The governments of France and Poland should make sure that in their countries proper risk maps of flood-prone areas exist. Also, a lot of learning costs and scale and scope advantages can be reached if these maps are prepared on the European level. Characterisations of risks and changes in the nature or magnitude of risks should be both qualitative and quantitative - that is, both descriptive and mathematical - consistent with available data. The characterisations should be broad enough to inform the range of activities to reduce risks. Judgements used in developing a risk assessment, such as assumptions, defaults, and uncertainties, should be stated explicitly. The information of the risk assessment based on these risk maps should be used for spatial planning purposes and flood insurance. The governments in Poland and France should implement a national flood insurance program. A national flood insurance program is a good measure, complementary to technical measures. Rather than attempting to physically control rivers by moving or shifting the flooding away from the people, this law recognises and encourages the need to control development in floodplains and to protect people from harm by relocating the people but not the floodwaters. The basic purpose is not to prohibit, but to guide development in floodplain areas, in a manner consistent with nature's needs to convey floodwaters, and a community's land use needs. Such a program should offer non-structural approaches to reduce flood damage. The program's purpose is to make available a flood insurance to property owners in flood-prone communities. Such program requires local governments to adopt and enforce floodplain regulations before flood insurance can be obtained in their community. The local regulations must meet the minimum program requirements established by the national government about building requirements in flood-prone areas and the financial responsibility for the coverage of the damage after a flood. 4.6.2. Social instruments Public participation Public participation in some form has also become an accepted norm of administrative decision making. Public participation is an essential component of good government. Members of the public can make relevant facts available to decision-makers and also allow them to view issues from different perspectives. If the public officials are attentive, better decisions should be the result. Public participation also has a desirable tendency to open up governmental decision making to public scrutiny. The public in general becomes better informed about how decisions are made in the real world and what factors actually motivate bureaucratic policy makers. Finally, broad public participation tends to produce a better record for judicial review. Educational programs People living in flood-prone areas should be kept aware of the risks they bear from a very early age. Educational programs are very helpful to achieve this goal. So, the state government should provide local municipalities in flood-prone areas with educational material. This material should contain information giving answers to questions like: what is the risk? what should I do? what should I not do? etc. 4.6.3. Organisational changes Co-ordination It has already been made clear that there is a lack of co-ordination regarding flood mitigation in Poland and on the European level. In France, the co-ordination can be improved, especially concerning the flood recovery system. Better co-ordination can be achieved by making clear legislation about what to do before, during and after a flood. This legislation should be made on the state level, so no uncertainties can arise about who is responsible for what. On the European level and in Poland it might prove useful to bring into being a new institution which co-ordinates all flood mitigation activities. Since on the European level and in Poland there is still no good experience on flood management this new institution can co-ordinate activities and let organisations learn from each other. Also, such institution can co-ordinate big national projects like the preparation of risk maps. In Europe, this institute can already start making these maps for their member states by using ENVI SAT and GIS systems. Communication Risk communication should involve the open, two-way exchange of information between professionals, including both policy makers and "experts" in relevant disciplines, and the public. Risk management goals should be stated clearly, and risk assessments and risk management decisions should be communicated accurately and objectively in a meaningful manner. To maximise public understanding and participation in risk management, programs should: · explain the basis for significant assumptions, data, models, and inferences used or relied upon in the assessment or decision; · describe the sources, extent and magnitude of significant uncertainties associated with the assessment or decision; · make appropriate risk comparisons, taking into account, for example, public attitudes with respect to voluntary versus involuntary risks; · provide timely public access to relevant supporting documents, a reasonable opportunity for public comments, and mechanism to incorporate public comments. 5. Problem analysis - socially attenuated risk perception of the slow flood hazard. 5.1. Introduction The underestimated risk perception of slow floods is one of the main problems leading to big losses in individual and collective property, changes in the habitants' everyday life style, a strong reason for psychological discomfort and post-floods depressions with symptoms similar to PTSD (post traumatic stress disorder). In this chapter, the problem will be described and analysed on the example of two case studies - river Somme basin in France and river Odra in Poland. The section 5.2. starts with a theoretical part on risk and risk perception. Further on, the causes of unrealistic risk perception in the Somme area and Odra river will be discussed in more detail touching such aspects as the perception of regional exposure to natural risks, overwhelming trust in technical anti-flood protection measures, lack of individual responsibility and insufficient awareness on the flood issue. Conclusions will be drawn in section 5.3. Finally, the Chapter 5 will end up with a proposition of measures. 5.2. Problem description and analysis 5.2.1. Risk and risk perception Risk is a primary factor in many political matters, often more important to the general public than any other considerations. Certain facets of the perceived risk are strongly related to the demand for risk mitigation . Risk perception by the general public is, thus, essential information in decision-making concerning floods. To start this Chapter, it seems reasonable firstly give a definition of risk, risk perception, its peculiarities and factors influencing it. In the present paper, risk associated with floods is defined as the probability of facing harm caused by floods. Risks definitions besides scientific evaluation include social, economic, political and personal values assessment. The working definition of risk perception used in the present report is the following: risk perception is one's opinion about the likelihood of risks, associated with a certain activity or a certain lifestyle. In case of floods, such kinds of activity or lifestyle could be settlement in a flood-prone area or undertaking of anti-floods measures. One of the commonly accepted in the decision theory definition of risk says that situation is risky whenever you are not certain of the outcome of your action . Risk is related to any losses: financial losses, social losses etc. There are two important characteristics of risk. The first characteristic relates to the amount of losses. The second one is about the likelihood of losses. In case of such natural disaster as flood, the probability of losses is not very high but the amount of losses is really big. Risk implies decision-making . In the face of significant catastrophic potential, political action is absolutely vital. However, in face of risk complexity and unknown factors of catastrophic potential, these decision are increasingly disabled. One of the assumptions of the present project is that different factors influence risk perception. Risk perception of a certain individual is influenced by certain factors as, for instance, memory of risk, mass media, education, social and cultural background, legislation, insurance, availability of technical measures. In other words, the risk perception of a certain hazard at a certain period of time is a result of the direct and indirect influence of the above mentioned factors (see fig. 3). Figure 3. Factors influencing risk perception The starting point for preparing the policy dealing with flood management is the realistic risk perception. The figure 4 below describes the interaction of risk perception, public policy and factors influencing risk perception. Therefore, if the risk perception is not adequate to the actual risk of flooding hazard and is attenuated it means that the factors influencing it are not perfect, poorly developed, unadjusted or hardly used. To reach the realistic risk perception of the hazard one should implement such public policy that would change and amplify the factors of risk perception. That, in turn, help educate the realistic risks perception. Figure 4. Interaction of risk perception, public policy and the factors of risk perception. The memory of risk is one of the most important factors influencing risk perception. The personal experience has the biggest impact on the reality perception than the theoretical knowledge. In other words, the credibility of personal experience for individuals is much more higher than the credibility of external sources of information. Usually the following three stages of risk analysis are defined: · risk assessment, · risk management, · risk communication. Risk assessment is the scientific assessment of the actual risk. Risk management allows reaching the supportive decisions under incorporation of non-scientific factors. Finally, risk communication implies the communication and discussion of the policy decisions. The risk perception understanding is important as it helps to know how to assess and manage risks. People tend to evaluate risk in a multidimensional but subjective manner and, as a result, some risks become socially amplified while others socially attenuated. It means that some risks may be perceived as greater or smaller than scientific measures would suggest, i.e. the risk is over- or underestimated. It seems problematic to change the actual risk associated with some activity, but much easier - its perception. Experts often rank the relative importance of various risks differently. Generally, scientists define risks in the language and procedures of science itself. They consider - the nature of the harm that may occur, - the probability that the harm will occur and - the number of people who may be affected. Most ordinary people, in contrast, are less aware of probabilities and the size of risk, and much more concerned with severity of risk consequences, i.e. qualitative attributes. Risk perception peculiarities Of special interest there are the following peculiarities in the ordinary people's risk perception. 1. The perception of risk is often influenced by whether people feel they can control risks or not. 2. It is common that people misperceive risk associated with a particular activity because of the lack of information. Being misinformed they make wrong conclusions and/or decisions and neglect the real threats. 3. People see risks as a multidimensional value, do not assess it by a numerical scale and judge it according to its subjective (social, psychological) characteristics and content . 4. People's responses and attitudes to risk are strongly influenced by their experiences and cultural values. So, isolated facts about risks may have limited impacts on their acceptability. 5. People also usually judge risk according to their perception of its controlling agents (for example, if these controlling agents are independent regulatory bodies, or reliable and respective enough) and if the public is involved in the process of risk management. 6. Personal risk is rated lower than risk to people in general, which in turns is rated lower than risk regarding the threat to society. 7. People are never positive about the risks and/or about the risk controlling institutions. Usually they strongly mistrust the officials. 8. The following factors directly influence risk perception: - catastrophic potential: people are more concerned about fatalities and injuries that are grouped in time and space than about fatalities and injuries that are scattered or random in time and space, - familiarity: people are more concerned about unfamiliar risks, - understanding: people are more concerned about poorly understood events, - scientific uncertainty: people are more concerned about risks that are scientifically unknown or uncertain, - risk controllability, - institutional trust, - mass media attention, - accident history. Experts dealing with flood problems often underline the complexity of this issue. This complexity can be regarded from different perspectives and scales. It might include the statistic nature of the hazard, the local characteristic of an inundated area, different cultural backgrounds of victims, the different types of stakeholders involved in crisis management and anti-flood defense, differences in risk perception of citizens and civil servants, experts and decision makers, the uncertainty concerning climate change, the nowadays changes in individual life style and so on. 5.2.2. Evolution analysis of the risk perception of the slow flood hazard in the Somme valley After some theory on risk perception has been given, its detailed implications will be analyzed in the following case studies below. In particular, the perception of risk exposure will be described and analyzed from different prospectives: risk perception for the whole country, regional risk perception and perception by types of risk. That will give us an opportunity to see how the risk of flooding is perceived by the population of the Somme valley being at flood risk and compare the data with other regions of France. The risk of flooding results from a combination of natural factors and human interference. In general terms, human actions can influence flooding either by affecting run-off patterns, for ex. urbanisation, river channelisation or by increasing the possible impact of flooding , for ex. greater exposure of human populations through the occupation of flood plains. The phenomena of socially attenuated risk perception of slow floods will be investigated below based on the empirical case study conducted in the Somme valley, France. The Chart 5 shows the rating of risks to which the citizens of metropolitan France feel mostly exposed in their area of residence. The risks offered as options to chose include storms, floods, subsidence, forest fire etc. There is such answer option as "feel exposed to none of the risks" and "do not know". As it is seen from the table, the risk of flooding is rated the second (23,7%) after the risk of storms (28,4%) on the first place. Other risks such as the risk of subsidence, forest fire, earthquakes, etc. follow afterwards. Here, it is interesting to note that 18,6% of the French questioned do not feel exposed to none of these risks. Chart 5. The natural risks to which French people feel mostly exposed in their area of residence (in %). Source: L'opinion des Français sur l'environnement et leur perception des risques naturels. IFEN. 2000 However, if one considers the distribution of opinions on the risk exposure by the regions of metropolitan France the following tendencies will be seen. Table 3 below shows such distribution by selected regions of France, such as the North, East, West and Mediterranean. The table3 clearly shows that the population of the north regions of France where the Somme valley is situated does not feel very much exposed to the risk of floods. Just 19,2% of the total population of the northern regions feel troubled by the risk of flood in comparison with East (32,3%) and Mediterranean region (41,2%). It may be explained by the fact that in those regions floods are of flash character, therefore, they do make people feel concerned. Floods occurred in the northern part of France are slow, so people can feel a false sense of controllability that reduces the risk perception of slow floods. Table 3. Distribution of opinions of French citizens on the exposure to natural risks by regions of metropolitan France (in %). Name of the natural risks Storms Floods Subsidence Forest fire Earthquakes None of these risks Total of the population North 38,1 19,2 17,9 -- 1,3 18,3 100 East 11,8 32,3 11,2 4,3 8,0 23,0 100 West 72,9 12,8 2,0 1,1 2,0 6,4 100 Mediterranean 4,3 41,2 0,5 27,3 17,0 5,5 100 Source: L'opinion des Français sur l'environnement et leur perception des risques naturels. IFEN. 2000 Of particular interest there is table 4 that shows the distribution of opinions of French by the type of risk. It is clearly seen that among the persons who feel the mostly exposed to the risk of flood 5,4% only live in the northern part of France. That is an evidence of low risk perception of floods and slow floods in particular. Table 4. Distribution of opinions of French citizens on the exposure to natural risks by type of the natural risk (in %). Name of the natural risks Storms Floods Subsidence Forest fire Earthquakes None of these risks North 9,0 5,4 14,5 -- 1,2 6,6 East 3,6 12,0 11,9 5,0 9,6 10,9 West 35,5 7,5 3,4 2,0 3,7 4,7 Mediterranean 1,8 20,5 0,8 42,5 27,5 3,5 Source: L'opinion des Français sur l'environnement et leur perception des risques naturels. IFEN. 2000 The survey has been conducted by the laboratory of environmental psychologie, Paris, in November 2001. The poll was 50 interviewed persons. The results below clearly show that the flooding does not bother the residents of the Somme valley very much. It is possible to say that the Somme inhabitants do not consider the flooding as a reoccurring event in their area of residence. Therefore, no modifications in their lifestyle or relations with the environment have taken place. Rather, the residents continued to affirm their individualism, attachment to the territory and a style of life. Chart 6. Distribution of opinions of the Somme residents on the point whether the risk of flooding is far from being the first trouble among other residents' concerns (in %) Source: Analyse psychologique aupres des sinistrés des inondations de la Somme. Laboratoire de Psychologie Environnementale. November 2001. Trust in technical measures Having studied the opinion of the French citizens and the residents of the Somme valley in particular on the exposure to the risk of flooding, of interest there will be the following graph. The Chart 7 below shows that, according to the majority of the residents of the Somme valley (71%), the threatened people have the right to live where they want to in spite of the possible risks it might impose. 29% strongly disagree with that statement. One explanation of that can be that the population has a poor memory of flooding and low awareness ,thus, they estimate this risk as a very low one. Or the population has a strong democratic feeling and individualism. Chart 7. The distribution of opinions of the citizens of the Somme valley on the point that the citizens have a right to live where they want to in spite of the risks it might impose (in %). Source: Analyse psychologique aupres des sinistrés des inondations de la Somme. Laboratoire de Psychologie Environnementale. November 2001. The cause of the very low estimation of the risk of flooding is a strong belief of the Somme residents in technical solutions to solve the problem of flooding. According to the graph provided below, the majority of the Somme population (63%) is unanimous about the statement that there is a technical solution to solve the flooding problem. 33% more or less agree with that. 4% only strongly disagree. Chart 8. The distribution of opinions of the citizens of the Somme valley on the point that there is a technical solution to solve a problem of flooding (in %). Source: Analyse psychologique aupres des sinistrés des inondations de la Somme. Laboratoire de Psychologie Environnementale. November 2001. Responsibilities in case of a flood event In the frame of all above mentioned, it seems reasonable to investigate the opinion of the citizens of the Somme valley on the distribution of responsibilities in flood prevention and management. The Chart 9 below shows that a majority of the population (54%) does not agree on the point that it is the responsibility of the private owners to protect themselves against the future flood. Only 17% agree that it is up to the private owners to take some preventive measures against future inundations. These results speak of the prevailing community opinion that someone else but not the possible victims of a flood should protect them to prevent or reduce the risk of being flooded. Chart 9. The distribution of opinions of the citizens of the Somme valley on the point of individual responsibilities to take measures against future flooding events (in %). Source: Analyse psychologique aupres des sinistrés des inondations de la Somme. Laboratoire de Psychologie Environnementale. November 2001. At the same time, most of the citizens of the Somme valley believe that it is the responsibility of the government to protect their houses against future flooding hazards (see Chart 10). 59% think this way. 33% of the population more or less agree with that statement. And a very small minority (8%) does not share this opinion. Chart 10. The distribution of opinions of the Somme residents on the point that it is the responsibility of the government to take measures against future flooding events (in %). Source: Analyse psychologique aupres des sinistrés des inondations de la Somme. Laboratoire de Psychologie Environnementale. November 2001. Of interest will be the distribution of opinions of the Somme residents on the degree of their satisfaction with the work of the elected members to ameliorate the problem of the inundation (see Chart 11). 42% of the surveyed residents do not agree on the point that the elected members do their best to change the problem of the flood for the best. 29% of the population are satisfied with the work of the elected members to eliminate or reduce the risk of flooding. And another 29% more or less agree. In the theoretical part on risk perception at the beginning of the present Chapter, it was said that ordinary people are never positive about the risk controlling institutions. Usually, they strongly mistrust the officials. Data presented below seems to support this statement. Chart 11. The distribution of opinions of the citizens of the Somme valley on the point that the elected members do their best to ameliorate the problem of the flooding (in %). Source: Analyse psychologique aupres des sinistrés des inondations de la Somme. Laboratoire de Psychologie Environnementale. Novembre 2001. Psychology explains this phenomena. People can suffer a lot as a consequence of the flood. They become victims of the natural hazard. It is very difficult for them to accept this fact since such situation does not allow them to be compensated by nature. The causes of losses has to be personified. The person responsible for disaster is needed. The most suitable to be blamed are high rank civil servants, authorities, decision-makers etc. Often, the victims of the flood start thinking in the following manner: THEY do not protect, they do not warn, they do not foresee…. Information on the risk of flood Awareness of the population on the risk of flood is an efficient tool in flood prevention. In the given section, some information will be provided on the awareness of the French population about the natural risks in the region where they live on the example of the regions cited above: Mediterranean, East, West and the North. The question asked in the survey was whether the citizens have been informed on the natural risks existing in their area of residence. It is obvious from the Chart 12 that the northern parts of France are the mostly uninformed ones in France (91%) about the natural risks threatening their living areas. To compare, in the Mediterranean region every of the four citizens is informed about the risks of natural hazards existing in their area of residence. Chart 12. Awareness of the French citizens on the risks of natural hazards existing in their area of residence (in %). Source: L'opinion des Français sur l'environnement et leur perception des risques naturels. IFEN. 2000 The following table shows the distribution of opinions of French citizens on the point who in the first place should inform them about the natural risks existing in their areas of residence. According to the majority of French (67%), this is the mayor who should provide the information about natural risks. The second source of information is the mass media (TV, radio, local press etc.) that constitutes 8%. The other administrative bodies such as prefecture, state, region are even less evoked. Table 5. The distribution of opinions of French citizens on the information sources to inform them about the risks of natural hazards in their residencies (in %). The source of information % of French citizens The mayor 67 Mass media 8,0 Prefecture 6,4 State 6,1 Region 2,2 Others 6,4 Doesn't know 3,8 Total 100 Source: L'opinion des Français sur l'environnement et leur perception des risques naturels. IFEN. 2000 5.2.3 Evolution analysis of the risk perception of the flood hazard in River Odra basin. Although the present project is focusing on the slow flood issue, the data on risk perception evolution was available on the upstream part of Odra where event was rather of a fast character. From the figure mentioned it is clear that in case of the 1997 flood on Odra the flood event was gradually changing from the fast in the upstream to the slow one in the downstream part. Therefore, it is considered appropriate to compare these two flood events in France and Poland. In this section, some observations will be made on the Odra River case study. The beginning of flood in 1997 overtook the Polish population. During the interviews with different kind of Polish experts such opinion was heard many times. The flood started earlier in the upstream part of the river, and with some delay the flood wave reached the downstream communities. The psychologist Lukaszewski describes how the risk perception was changing during the propagation of a flood wave downstream. In summer (July) 1997, it was heavily raining without stopping during four days. The signals of the coming flood eventually materialised. The news programs communicated a lot about a flood in the town of Morawy, Czech Republic, and an inundation of Raciborz, a Polish city, situated very closely to the Czech border. People could hear about rising water level of Odra river, about overflow of small watercourses. People saw trees and floors of houses floating in the river. The signals of coming catastrophe were more and more visible. In the areas which were inundated first people did not react. They simply ignored information. Sometimes, their behavior resembled temporary blindness and deafness. Soon, the signals of flood were so visible that it was impossible to ignore them. That was the time for unrealistic optimism. The statement that the hazard would happen with my neighbor but not with me was widely spread. Lukaszewski explains that sometimes such attitude can be very useful because it helps cope with totally uncontrolled and unavoidable situations. In case of flood, it is not the optimal strategy. When the hazard is coming, it is better to be an active pessimist than an unrealistic optimist. During the Odra flood in 1997, people in the downstream parts more easily accepted the flood than the population in the upstream parts of Odra. Although the hazard overtook the population of the upstream city of Opole, the population of Olawa and Wroclaw situated downstream were not surprised by the coming flood. As a consequence, the population of Wroclaw did a lot to protect themselves against the flood. Szemplinski , the journalist of Gazeta Wyborcza, described this phenomena: " People somehow defended spontaneously. In Wroclaw, people crowded on the dykes. Everyone tried to do something. There was general mobilization. For example, near a rail station people used sand bags and constructed a special "channel", so water could spread further." It is interesting to supplement the above mentioned observation by information about the responsibilities in case of a flood. In 1998, the psychological research was carried out in order to study the people's strategy to cope with the flood stress . During this survey, in Wroclaw, 41 victims of the 1997 flood and 25 victims of the 1988 flood in Polanica, a village close to Wroclaw, were interviewed. These two groups of people were asked a question whether they understand the connection between the losses incurred and the experienced flood . In Wroclaw, none of the interviewed people mentioned the connection between experienced losses and their personal choices, like, for example, lack of insurance. In Polanica, only two people mentioned the fact that their personal choice to live close to the river was the reason for he flood damage. Nevertheless, the interviewed persons often underlined that the government did not prevent and protect them enough before and during the flood. However, some shift in the mentality of the suffered population occurred. In his interview, Szemplinski said that in Wroclaw city the flood of 1997 caused special trauma, and now people are more sensitive about signals of the coming flood. Gazeta Wyborcza itself did not conduct any special anti-flood campaign. However, the journalist noted that in case of two-day lasting rain they would start speculate on the beginning of flood. It is possible to make a conclusion that people's opinion concerning the likelihood of flood risk has changed radically as a consequence of the 1997 flood in Odra river basin. Before that inundation, none of the citizens discussed the possibility of occurrence of such a natural disaster. After the 1997 flood, the likelihood of the flood became a topic of everyday conversation. The change in people's mentality was a result of experiences gathered during the 1997 flood. The observed reaction of people during the propagation of the flood wave downstream showed the sufferers were very much surprised by the magnitude of the event. The change of people's opinion concerning the likelihood of flood risk took short period of time. This change in people risk perception is a positive thing. However, taking into account the size of economical losses and, moreover, social and psychological damages, this is the most painful way to change people's risk perception of the flood hazard. Therefore, some measures should be found and implemented to form the adequate risk perception of people living in flood-prone areas. 5.3. Conclusions Flooding is one of the major natural hazards to human society and an important influence on the social and economic development. On one side, the increasing social and economic development is posing pressure on land use within the flood-prone areas, from the other side, the potential for flood damage is augmenting. Though the slow flood hazard presents no risk for life of human beings, it brings substantial economic losses to businesses and private owners, changes a normal life style for a prolonged period of time and introduces stress and depression to humans. Having studied carefully the risk perception of the slow flood of the residents in the Somme valley and River Odra, their opinions on distribution of responsibilities to prevent, protect and inform in case of a future flooding as well as their beliefs and mistrust it is possible to make the following conclusions: The valley of the Somme River · The risk perception of the slow flooding is very low in the Somme valley. There is no memory of risk in the region. Even after the flooding in April 2001 residents did not change their style of life and did not expect the reoccurrence of the flooding of the same or greater significance. The reasons for that might be a slow character of the event and a strong trust in technical measures. A notion of risk has just started to be a part of the framework to manage and communicate the effects of flooding. It is strongly believed that it should be an essential element of any flood prevention policy. · The impressive trust in technical solutions to solve a flooding problem leaves much to be desired. The inhabitants feel safe living in flood-prone areas. Therefore, the prominence of non-structural measures for flood defense should be increased as a part of the sustainable river management. · A threatened individual does not take any preventive measures on his own to eliminate or reduce the risk of flooding. He rather believes that it is the solely responsibility of the government to protect the threatened population from a future flood. At the same time, the population concerned does not feel satisfied with the work of elected members responsible for flood prevention and protection. · The population of the North regions to which the Somme valley belongs to turned out to be the most uniformed on the natural risks threatening their living residences. The inhabitants strongly believe that it is the mayor who on the regular basis should inform them about the risks of natural hazards possible in their areas of residence. The mass media here is not very well employed and could be of great use in the future. The River Odra basin · The opinion of the inhabitants of Odra river basin concerning the likelihood of the flood changed noticeably during the flood in 1997. The example of Odra downstream cities and communities showed that common mobilization of effort was promising. Therefore, these positive experiences should be used to promote public involvement in the crisis management and the flood management. · Nowadays, citizens are very sensitive to the signals forecasting a coming flood. Because the flood issues still strongly attract citizens' attention, this potential should be used to more inform people about the flood disaster issue. · People tend to rely on the government which, in their opinion, is obligated to deal with the flood issue and protect them against the flooding. The connection between their personal choices like, for example, the localization of a house and the personal vulnerability to the flood disaster seems to be poorly accepted. 5.4. Measures In this section, some measures to educate the realistic risk perception of the slow floods will be given. The measures proposed are non-structural ones, therefore, present a low-cost option that is their main advantage. Their other advantage is that they have minor or no side effects. Some of the recommended measures started being implemented by the French and Polish governments though there are some differences in the implementation determined by regional circumstances. The aim of the proposed non-structural measures is to support the process of integration of risk perception issue into the flood management policy and enhance the slow flood risk perception of ordinary people, civil servants, local authorities etc. The realistic risk perception would help people accept their personal responsibility for flood protection. Citizens have to realize their impact on current anti-flood practices. In the present section, some techniques of public involvement will be presented. This idea was emphasized in two very important documents on the flood issue. During Local Authorities confronting Disasters and Emergencies 2nd International conference (Amsterdam, 1996) it was stated that desirable disaster management should incorporate some ideas concerning sustainable development and Local Agenda 21, inter alia active cooperation with stakeholders. 'Local authorities should direct their efforts not only at the central level of government and administration but definitely at their own local context as well: citizen groups, voluntary associations, small business, intermediary organization could and should be invited to take an active part in building up counter disaster capacities.' Similar idea was also expressed in the RIPARIUS (project funded by EC) report. 'Before any major improvements in public response to flood warnings can be expected social attitudes need to be changed, away from reliance on 'the authorities' and towards 'self-help' or 'community help''. To solve many local and global problems there is a need for combining the scientist approach, technical measures with human dimension. It can be assured by some statements from RIPARIUS report. It says that if the right social environment or 'self help' or 'community spirit' is created, the general public is more likely to seek information and make better use of new technologies than if the people are simply directed to do so. Therefore, at global and local scales economic, social, cultural, and ecological processes should be regarded as interrelated parts of the same system. For many years the structural measures have been considered the best ones to protect the population living in flood-risky areas. They are as follows: flood control reservoirs, areas for controlled flooding, soil protection and reforestation, river channelisation, protection dykes, etc. The extensive implementation of structural measures stimulated the development of communities in areas that are still at risk of flooding The effect of such overwhelming trust in structural anti-flood measures is a false sense of safety destroyed every time a flood happens bringing frustration and depression to the sufferers. And what is the most striking that it does not change the attitude of victims to future implementation of technical measures. Rather their failure makes the flood sufferers use them more and more. Therefore, it seems reasonable to implement non-structural measures. These measures do not have a direct effect on the flood discharge but try to reduce the damage caused by possible flood events by means of a proper flood management rather than a construction policy. The non-structural measures targeting the upbringing of the realistic risk perception of the slow flood are the social instruments and flood plain zoning that will be discussed below in the following sections. 5.4.1. Social instruments. The realistic risk perception cannot be reached by a simple direct regulation coming from the government or by fiscal measures introduced in a suffered region. The instruments to be implemented are of persuasive character. Changing the risk perception is rather a slow process based, first of all, on risk communication with extensive use of all information sources. Consultations and information campaigns are the essential elements of this process. As it has been said, the government employs social regulation to persuade social actors to change their behavior. Efforts are best concentrated on voluntarily behavioral change. This does not necessarily mean that there is a general willingness to make the changes. The ground for that has to be prepared for the risk of slow floods to become a matter of course in any decision. Public hearing The advantage of this technique is that public hearings meet legal requirements for public participation, and relatively easy to convene, have the potential to reach many interested and affected parties, and enable these parties to express their views. The disadvantage is that public hearings are often pro forma and occur too late for input to be meaningful for an organization. Citizen Advisory Committees and Task Forces Individuals are appointed to advisory committees and task forces by an organization to consider an issue or issues. Task forces tend to be created to consider a specific issue in depth, with the goal of providing recommendations, after which the task force is disbanded. Citizen advisory committee have indefinite life spans. Otherwise, the two kinds of groups are about the same . Strength: Continuously meeting groups can build a common base of information, discuss complex issues, and promote better mutual understanding of the concerns of the sponsoring agencies and the group members. Concerns: Who appoints the advisory committee or task force? Do participants represent opinion of organized interest groups or the larger population? Who determines the agenda? Do all interested and affected parties have time and expertise to participate fully and effectively? Will the agency take committee recommendations seriously? Citizens' Juries and Citizens Panels Citizens' juries rely on a randomly selected pool of citizens to evaluate policy alternatives. Typically, citizens juries are asked to express a preference among three or four political options. Staff from, or selected by, an organization set the charge and usually impose the principle of majority vote as the means used to resolve conflicts. Majority vote does not guarantee the integrity of minor interest positions in discourse. An oversight committee is limited to those selected through random sampling procedures . Strengths: Citizens juries represent interested and affected parties' knowledge, positions, and perspectives, largely by virtue of the random sample. Competence in citizen's juries is encouraged by face-to-face mediated discussions in which everyone has an equal opportunity to make statements, challenge others' statements, and express opinions. Citizens' jury approach does not necessarily promote critical inquiry into the factual issues or use a systematic method to reach the best possible understanding about facts and states of affairs. The strengthening of informal water management structure. Olsthoorm (2001) underlines that in the Netherlands water management is not only determined by its formal structure but the role of the informal structure is very important as well. This informal structure consists of all kinds of interactions between stakeholders that not ruled by law. One of the recommendation is to find the potential informal key organization, both in Poland and France, and make them involved in the process strengthening the flood risk. In Poland, an organization like Association of Polish Cities or Association of Polish Counties can play an important role in this process. Such organization should have opportunity to apply for financial assistance. Creation of information-co-ordination centers. Such centers with developed data base could be a focal point in strengthening the flood perception. The attention should be paid inter alia to exchange of the best practice, trainers training, the promotion of the state of the art. The advantage is that the establishment of such structure is entailed by new Polish Water Law . Mass media campaigns The socially attenuated risk perception of slow floods is, first of all, a problem of information and awareness. It is the so-called communicative aspect. The communicative aspect can be further divided into information and education campaigns. At this, the mass media plays an important role in shaping public opinion. The disadvantage of employment of the mass media as a social instrument is that it searches rather for the sensation. Exactly this happened in the Somme valley during the recent flood event in April 2001. Consequently, negative image of the suffered area, though only some parts of the department of Picardie were flooded, contributed to the losses in tourism sector . However, the negative mass media coverage has brought about such an all-country movement called "solidarité". Donations from all around the country were coming to the suffered regions being flooded. As has been mentioned, the mass media has both negative and positive features and, certainly, should be employed due to its ubiquity and the power of influence. Not to forget to mention, a new social instrument as Internet and already in place one - radio. The only concern is that access to Internet in Poland not very widely spread yet. Before changing the behavior, people need a collective image about the state of affairs in flood prevention and protection management, some developments, causes and effects of the slow flood. General information of this kind provided through information and education campaigns must be followed by more specific information on behavior alternatives. General public education is an effective tool that the government has at its disposal to bring the realistic risk perception of the slow floods to the population. Risk education aspects might be incorporated into a number of subjects taught at primary and secondary schools. Such classes would suggest alternative forms of behavior and emphasize the responsibility of every individual to protect himself against the flooding. Campaigns designed to alter public behavior have not been fully developed yet. The example of it might be the "anti-flood groups" who provide information on individual flood prevention and protection measures and help the threatened population make their houses flood-proof. Another example is "the anti-flood information telephone line" designed for population residing in flood-prone areas. The people could ask any question relating to the flood forecasting in the current year, actions to take in a flood emergency, post-flood behavior or what preventive measures are worth to be taken. 5.4.2. Flood plain zoning Non-structural measures relating to land-use planning of potential flood plains are partially already in place in France. They include the maps (plans of prevention of risks - PPR) identifying the risk zones, prohibiting or reducing the number of installation in these zones, reinforcing flood forecasting and alert systems, etc. The objective of such maps is to inform the authorities and the public about the flood risk derived from occupying a flood plain. However, the development of PPR is going very slowly. In 1998, approved PPR documents had been produced for only 10% of the communities identified as being at risk of natural disaster, and many of the large cities have not yet been covered. It is recommended to speed up the development of PPRs and communicate them further to the authorities and the public. This communication of the degree of the flood risk will open a debate on the most appropriate flood prevention and protection measures. 6. Problem analysis - shortcomings of flood damage recovery and compensation in France and Poland. 6.1 Introduction The aim of this Chapter is to describe and analyse the Polish and French insurance system based on two case studies in France and Poland. The structure of the present Chapter is the following. In the section below, the general description of the problem will be given. Flood insurance systems of France and Poland will be analysed in more detail in sections 5.2.1. and 5.2.2. Conclusions will be drawn in section 5.3. Non-structural solutions will be recommended in section 5.4. A number of technical solutions of a flood problem is already in place in France and Poland. Nevertheless, in a flood situation they prove not to be sufficient. Structural measures should be supported with non-structural instruments in order to prevent history from repeating itself. One of the non-structural flood mitigation measures is an adequate insurance and recovery system. Flood insurance enables the property owners, subject to potential fllooding, to spread an uncertain but large loss over a long period of time. It also provides mechanisms of spreading flood loss over a large area and a large number of individuals. In the situation where many different parties are involved (state, local governments, inhabitants, insurance companies), it is very difficult to find the best possible solutions and make all the parties involved satisfied. The reason for it is that all parties have different needs and, among others, a need for customised recovery. Therefore, an appropriate system of flood damage recovery and compensation should meet the needs of all stakeholders involved. In order to assure precise assessment and propose the best applicable measures, a proper description and analyses of the problem should be provided. 6.2 General description of the problem Financial resources for damage recovery come from different sources: insurance companies, state, private donations, public donations. During the present research it was found that, in most cases, there is a lack of co-ordination and little legislation on the responsibilities of post-flooding compensation. It was found out that in France and Poland the problem is one and the same. In those two countries, there is no co-ordination of organisations responsible for the post crisis management and financial recovery. In crisis situations, new bodies are brought into being that act often quite spontaneously. In France and Poland, the collection and distribution of money for flood mitigation is not sufficient. There is no timely reaction to the losses incurred by all parties involved. State aid often comes after a long time. Insurance companies, sometimes, block the compensation because they have problems with calculating the losses. The flood sufferers have to wait a long time for the recovery money. Some people complain that in their situation help came too late. Small private companies were complaining that losses were much higher than compensation. In both France and Poland, there was the problem with reliable estimation of the real costs of damages. During the present study it was found that even in places where the insurance system is well developed, the problem is that premiums are not in relation to the compensation. Both in France and Poland, there is no unified system of premium calculation based on proper risk assessment. Due to this confusion, people living in high flood risk areas are compensated much more than other people. "There is no relation between the premiums fixed by the public authorities and the degree of exposure to risk. The risks are spread and an element of solidarity is applied across the nation. The scope of the underwritten insurance determining the amount of the compensation was considered insufficient in relation to the damage sustained" . Another problem is that collecting figures about the flood damage proved to be a difficult task in the two countries. In both countries, it was a problem to find objective, comprehensive and reliable estimations of the real costs of damages. "Experience illustrates how difficult it is to obtain accurate data on overall damage when no specific and professional organisation is involved in collecting this kind of data" . It has been mentioned that an absence of maps of flood-prone areas constitutes a big problem. In cases where they do exist nobody knows about them. This is very awkward because these maps are very useful for spatial planners and insurance companies. Moreover, the general public might want to be informed about the exposure to the flood risk they bear living in a certain flood-prone area. It was found out that in France and Poland as well as on the European level, there is no legislation on flood risk assessment based on those risk maps. In some countries, refund system depends on governmental resources only, while in other countries there is a combination of governmental and private refunds. In spite of the big effort that has been made to improve the existing situation, flood recovery systems in Europe still have many week points. 6.2.1 French insurance system The French system of insurance is characterised by the combination of insurance and solidarity. It provides compensation for property and company damage. This system was implemented by the Constitution, and with some changes, it has been in force for more than 40 years. The French system has some advantages. First of all, due to solidarity, people are mostly insured because general obligatory insurance provides recovery for some damage suffered in a state of natural disaster. The recovery system guarantees that a part of any policy covers the losses caused by a natural disaster. The procedure of compensatioin for damage incured in case of a natural disaster in France is the following. When a natural disaster occurs, a suffered individual issues a declaration for his/her insurer and, simultaneously, sends the demand to the municipality. The municipality collects the demands from the suffered individuals and forwards them to the prefecture that, in its turn, accumulates the demands from the stricken municipalities. The central authority of civil protection and security receives the dossiers from the prefecture and sends them to the interministerial commission that studies those dossiers. After this, it makes a decision whether to announce or not the state of a natural disaster ("un arrete interministériel") for the municipalities that asked for such a status. When the state of natural disaster is officially declared insurance companies have to pay the compensation within three months starting from the state declaration. After the state declaration of natural disaster, special rules are established. These rules, however, apply only to those insured. These rules stipulate that in case of a natural disaster everybody who has a car or fire insurance can ask for some compensation. This covers some costs connected with natural disaster damages. French companies also have a possibility to insure themselves against the business losses related to floods. In that case, the insurance covers the loss of profits before tax and the extra running costs during the time of the official disaster. The French system of flood damage recovery has some negative aspects. One negative aspect is that the insurance companies are said to be profiting too much from the system. The possibility to reinsure the risk with the Central Fund for Reinsurance is hardly used. The reason for this is that the insurers are capable of insuring the disaster-related risk by themselves. Another negative aspect is that the insurance firms are imposing restrictions on areas with a relatively high risk. This can lead to the situation when insurance policies are actually rejected. That happened, for instance, in the commune of Bedsides, where an insurance group rejected to insure because of the high frequency of floods" . The French compensation system does not exclude other forms of aid, such as public and private donations, subsidies from the state, regions, municipalities, and the European Union. But even if there are many different subsidies and private donations this compensation always covers only part of the damage. Especially, public infrastructure, like roads and bridges, are not insured since it is not possible. In the French case, it is difficult to obtain exact figures on the total damage. Problems exist due to insufficient insurance for private properties and businesses. The French low-income families suffered during the flood were disappointed because they received a small compensation. When a policyholder, for instance, has a lot of cars and a lot of property, one automatically receives a lot of recovery money, while the damage in some cases is not that severe. Also, some businesses that were not directly flooded but suffered revenue losses were disappointed with the small or no compensation. Post flood management in France has many week points. Firstly, there is no legal framework outlining the administrative responsibilities and the communication problems that occur between all the involved institutions. Planned response coincides with improvisation. Official bodies, volunteers and aid organisations work all together with the same purpose but independently. The power of decisions depends quite often on the personality of actors and the socio-political circumstances of a certain area. The actors that are involved quite often do not operate on the equal level. Compensation and insurance during the flood event at the Somme valley in April 2001. When a flood ocurred in the Somme valley in April 2001 French government allocated 2,2 million francs for urgent needs of victims. These allocated funds were delegated to the prefect of the Somme who placed them at the disposal of the mayors of the concerned departments. The latter distributed those funds to the municipal centers of social actions ("des centres communaux d'action social CCAS"). Some time later, additional 10 million francs were announced to be allocated to cover the costs of restoration of non-insurable public objects. Not to forget to say that the floods in the Somme valley gave rise on the national level to solidarity. The donations were provided (in million francs): 7 by the General Council; 5,5 by Abbeville Solidarité Inondations Association; 10 by the Association of the mayors of the Somme valley; 0,6 by the Catholic Help; 0,65 by the public and 2,75 by the Red Cross. For the time being, there is no policy to provide an aid on the European Union level in case of any natural disaster in any of the member states. This is one of the proposal of the Senate to restore the line of the emergency aid if a disaster occurs. That kind of help on the European Union level was, however, abandoned by the European Commission and the Council three years ago. According to the estimations provided in the Inquiry Commission report the amount of compensations to be paid was equal to 100 million Euro (more than 650 million francs). However, the average costs of a flood event was equal to 1,5 billion francs. The relatively low costs of the flooding event at the Somme valley in April 2001 can be explained by two factors: firstly, a small number of the municipalities concerned (108) in comparison with 400 during the floods on the south of France in November 1999 and, secondly, the flooded zone at the Somme was not industrially dense. Table 4. The costs of floods since 1990 Date and place Compensations paid (billions of francs) January -March 1990 : half of the north of France 1,5 December 1993 - February 1994 : north and east 1,7 February 1995 : north, east and west 2,6 December 1996 : south-west 0,5 November 1999 : "the great south" 1,9 December 2000 - January 2001 : Bretagne 0,5 December - April 2001 : Somme 0,7 Source: FFSA, June 2001 and Caisse centrale de reassurance, evaluation of July 2001 On the other hand, the average costs per a disaster victim (between 100 000-150 000 francs) proved to be higher than the usual "average" expected in that case (33 200 francs for the last 12 years and 70 000 francs during the inundation in Bretagne). The higher rate of the damage is explained by the extraordinary duration of the flooding event as well as the necessity to partially or totally reconstruct the houses. The total calculated for the disaster victims in the Somme area presents the following picture: 2 000 dwellings damaged to varying degree, of them 1 600 with small losses (average costs from 20 000-30 000 francs) and 400 with significant damage (average costs 200 000 to 300 000 francs, 32 are to be completely destroyed). The uninsured person is not refunded. Overall, the French population is very well covered by the insurance. Only 0,5 up to 5% remain uninsured. However, the situation in the Somme valley is totally different. According to the preliminary report by Claude Lefrou , there are 10 to 15% of uninsured victims in the Somme. The less insured area turned out to be the Planches district at Abbevile. The limitations in the present insurance system appeared to be evident during the flood event as of April 2001 in the Somme valley. In particular, the deficiences found are the inequity between the insured and a lack of incentives addressing risk prevention. Those are described below. 1. Imperfect equity between the insured The possessions not declared in the insurance contract are not refunded. In case of the Somme inundation, the terms "badly insured" and "old contracts" came into being meaning that the insurance contracts that have never been updated present the risk of being not refunded. According to the data of the Senate report as of May 2001, insurance declarations of 15 to 20% of the Somme population present declaratory insufficiencies. Such people do not profit from the help provided in comparison with those who made some efforts to be secured. A policyholder may chose an insurance contract with more significant guarantees and pay more or he/she may chose a cheaper contract with much lower guarantees. The effort taken to be insured is not taken into account in this case. According to the amendment as of July 1982 putting a strict requirement for a direct material damage compensation, the companies not physically flooded cannot apply for compensation of their trading losses they might incur due to loss of access to their premises as a concequence of flooded vicinities. This situation was quite typical for the businesses situated in the Somme valley. 2. A lack of incentive to prevent risk of inundation A distinction can be made between two types of lack of incentives for people and organisations to protect themeselves against the negative consequences of floods. They are indifference of insurance companies and low responsibility on the part of the policyholders. The insurance companies are indifferent since the State guarantees them to be recompensated, i.e. it reinsures them. The rate of reinsurance is fixed. The payment of reinsurance compensation is done through the central reinsurance bank (La Caisse Centrale de Reassurance). Flood preventive measures that are to be fulfilled by the insured policyholders according to the plans of exposure to risks (Plans d'exposition aux risques) are not done since the insured will be refunded anyway. The insured companies consider their role as just financial one - to evaluate the damage incurred by a policyholder and compensate for that - and do not check if any of the prescribed works have been done. Presumably, the State should control the implementation of such measures. 6.2.2 Polish insurance system Regarding flood management, Polish system of compensation and insurance is very specific. The new Polish Water Law, that has been in process of creation for 10 years, does not deal with an issue of flood management at all. Different organisations are responsible for water management and, as a result, no specific organisation is responsible for co-ordination. The effect is that, in case of post flood recovery, nobody is responsible except insurance companies for flood damage compensation. And this is exactly the problem, since few people in Poland own a flood insurance policy. The main problem in Poland is that people strongly believe that the government is responsible for damage recovery. However, the real situation is that the Polish budget does not have the money for such kind of expenses. Also, if a new crisis occurs like in 1997, the Polish government has no money to compensate anyone or anything. The last experience showed that during the flood in 1997 only small percentage of people was insured by private insurance companies. For other people and infrastructure losses there was no money for compensation. So, as a result of the 1997 flood, the Polish government adopted the National Program of Reconstruction and Modernisation. A 200 ml $ loan agreement was signed with the World Bank in order to provide this program with financial support. It should be emphasised that this loan was very expensive. The World Bank demanded 25% of this money for their own management and operation costs. The Polish insurance system is characterised by the fact that people suffered from floods, received compensation only if they were insured against flood damage. Those who were not insured received some help from other organisations like the Red Cross, or were dependent on private donations. This kind of help is always insufficient and covers only basic needs. The 1997 flood on the Odra river showed that there is no financial system that could help people organise their lives after the crisis. People who were not insured could not rebuild their houses and suffered from lack of money and aid. Temporary dwellings were provided for those who suffered the most by the government and private sponsors. After the 1997 flood, local governments of the stricken municipalities applied to the state for some financial help that could cover the expenses for recovery of local infrastructure. The help from the state was insufficient and covered only a small part of the expenses. The State budget was not prepared for these additional high costs. Furthermore, it is important to admit that after the flood there were many private and public donations for the victims. The organisations included several media companies, churches, Caritas and the Red Cross. All these organisations were involved in collecting money and goods for people that suffered from the flood. Also, insurance companies were involved in the co-ordination and redistribution of possible compensations. The strong solidarity of the population should be mentioned. However, there was no organisation that co-ordinated all the activities. It is worth to point out that, though financial aspects are very important, the organisational aspect of getting the money is just as important. In the municipality of Raciborz, it was found that it is possible to apply for foreign investments from the EU and the World Bank, if there is a proper flood mitigation plan and a respected organisation. But the problem is that in Poland no such plans exist. The municipality of Raciborz is a good example of how a municipality can use foreign investments in flood prevention and flood mitigation since that municipality submitted a good flood prevention plan and a strategy. In most cases in Poland, foreign investments left unclaimed. On December the 18th 2001, the European Commission made a proposition to establish a network of 10 pilot river basins in order to test the guidance document and to define best practices for the implementation of the Water Framework Directive. The Commission proposed the Polish government to implement a demonstration project for integrated river basin management on the Vistula Basin and financed this project by ISPA and EU funds. For more than 6 months at the moment, there is no official answer that the Polish government is interested in this kind of co-operation. Another very important point is that, due to absence of legislation and lack of co-ordination, no organisation, even local municipalities cannot make use of risk maps, a basic tool in flood management. Insurance companies hardly believe that risk maps exist, and the water management offices (RZGW), that are theoretically responsible for preparation of this kind of maps are still in the process of their preparation (Warsaw office). During the interview the IMGW official in Warsaw said that they have data but they are not responsible for the preparation of these maps. He also added that a part of the World Bank project was responsible for the preparation of these maps, but they are still not ready. It was found that these kind of maps have been already prepared by the WWF for the Odra basin and the IMGW in Krakow use these kind of maps. This is really a good example of lack of co-ordination and communication between institutions responsible for flood management in Poland. 6.3 Conclusions Flood insurance is a complementary tool of hazard reduction. The purpose of flood insurance is to provide compensation for losses caused by a flood when damages are not avoidable at acceptable costs. In France and Poland, the coverage is fragmented and property owners have to purchase different policies in order to insure themselves against all major disasters. Flood insurance can only be seriously considered by property owners after necessary structural and non-structural mitigation measures have been undertaken. In Poland, for instance, the insurance sector is still weak and not in a position to calculate a realistic premium to build up a flood insurance portfolio. Also, a problem with insurance companies in Poland is that they do not include flood risk data, based on zoning information, in their premium structure. Another important conclusion that comes out is that generally the main problem is that there is no co-ordination between all organisations involved in flood mitigation in both countries. The two case studies showed that too many organisations are involved with different levels of competence and, as a result, those systems do not work efficiently. It is recommended that there should be one organisation to co-ordinate and control all activities of all different organisations, before and after the crisis. This organisation should be responsible for the collection of data and information and also the management on the administrative level. This organisation will be also responsible for the allocation of funds from local taxes and should control that all inhabitants of flood-prone areas are protected by additional and obligatory flood insurance. Also, a special land tax should be implemented in the area where with the high risk of inundation. This tax will support local communities in case of public infrastructure damage. This kind of system should be based on proper risk assessment in the format of risk maps of flood-prone areas. Furthermore, it is worth to add that a tax and an obligatory insurance will enhance the risk perception of people in flood risky areas that will result in better self-protection against the risk of flood. An obligatory insurance system with balanced premiums based on proper risk assessment will make sure that, in case of an accident, everyone will be treated equally. Additionally, there should be a controlling body that would control how the compensation money is spent. 6.4 Measures This section will describe some possible measures that could be implemented according to the above drawn conclusions. There are different options for the compensation of flood damage. · The first option is that the victims should bear the damage caused by floods, · The second option is that private insurance companies should cover the loses, · The third option is to rely on social self-regulation, in particular, on charity organisations. · The last option includes governmental support. This option may compensate total or partial damage and involve both governmental supported insurance schemes and the use of non-premium related public disaster support funds. Generally, possible measures available in the compensation system could be divided into three groups: Compensation by government - Ad-hoc settlements, which means that, according to special agreement between the government and victim groups, the government is responsible for the compensation. - Legal settlements, where the law provides compensation for exceptional natural events, and there is a special organisation responsible for this compensation. In case of legal settlements, compensation is administrated by the national disaster compensation fund. Insurance system with governmental support - Voluntary insurance system with financial support from government. It means that the state is responsible for damage compensation together with insurance companies. Insurance system without governmental support - Pool of insurance with different available possibilities of insurance policy, and the government is aware of recovery and compensation, - Individual insurance with no public flood insurance, and the state is not responsible for flood damage recovery. Generally, the public expects to be compensated suffered from the damage of floods. Therefore, the post-flood mitigation is an important political issue. Economic instruments Below, possible economical measures will be presented for France, Poland and Europe. The economic instruments to be mentioned are fiscal instruments and subsidies. Fiscal instruments can have two objectives. The first objective is that it can discourage the further building in flood-prone areas. The second objective of raising taxes is to get revenues, which can be used for flood mitigation. All taxpayer-funded flood disaster relief should be contingent upon taking flood mitigation action. The roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of the public, the various levels of government and the private sector should be clarified and strengthened. Citizens, businesses, and local and state legislators need to better understand that the government will not always bail them out after a flood. They must bear their fair share of the risk and the costs. A big disadvantage is that additional taxes require bureaucratic machinery. Especially, it is difficult for developing countries like Poland where it is still a problem with for governmental institutions to function properly. The allocation of funds is also problematic. Regarding economic efficiency it is clear that higher taxes will support local government and will generate additional revenues that could be allocated for different expenditures, like enhancement of non-structural anti-flood measures, e.g. education and system of co-ordination. Part of additional revenues that has been generated by increasing land taxes should be allocated for subsidies for low-income families to support them with obligatory flood policy. Subsidies are a very popular form of state aid. It can be used to help low income families to protect themselves or to get an insurance. The subsidies can also be used for to low income families to be compensated for the losses incurred during a flood. Finally, the subsidies can be used to stimulate people to move from very risky flood-prone areas. 7. Conclusions The society has allocated considerable funds for technical means for flood protection and research on this topic. In the meantime, the attention given to economic and, especially, social and institutional instruments for reducing the flood hazards is still very modest though the socio-economic tools might be as powerful as traditional technical ones. Therefore, the combination of structural and non-structural means could bring significant benefits to the flooded communities regarding sustainable flood management. In this Chapter, the concluding recommendations will be made on the best non-structural measures to prevent or reduce the risk of flood hazard. The argumentation of the choice will be also presented. Not to forget to mention that that all the measures proposed sooner or later will have to be taken to achieve sustainable flood management in environmental and socio-economic terms. This document will serve as a guidance for the governments of France and Poland as well as for the European Commission on the issue of sustainable long-term flood management. In the previous Chapters of the present study three problems were identified in flood protection polices. They are the institutional drawbacks in flood management structure, socially attenuated risk perception of the slow flood hazard, and the deficiencies in flood recovery and compensation. Therefore, the non-structural tools are proposed from the institutional, social and financial dimensions in Table 5. The assessment of the measures is carried according to three criteria, such as public acceptance, administrative feasibility, economic costs, and the time factor. The following indices qualify the assessment of the measures according to the above mentioned criteria: "++" - very good; "+" - good; "0" - indifferent; "-" - bad; "-" - very bad; * - potential for short-term implementation. Table 5. Matrix of measures based on three assessment criteria and the time factor. From the institutional dimension, all the measures seem to have a wide public acceptance, except state legislation on the land planning. The burden of economic costs is not very high for such measures as implementation of local risk communication strategy, state legislation on flood recovery, and flood-plain zoning. The main drawback of the majority of the proposed institutional tools is that they are not applicable in a short-term prospective. All the recommended institutional measures are suitable for implementation in France and Poland. In order to achieve a long-term sustainable flood management they are to be implemented in a full package. Amelioration of the flood management system requires many and different instruments to be used. The most economically efficient social instruments are citizens' juries and citizens' panels, citizen advisory committee and task forces. The costs of the mass media campaigns which are very powerful and relatively easy to organise may be different depending on the voluntarily involvement of the media. According to the public acceptance criteria, the most efficient social instruments are general public education, establishment of information co-ordination centers and strengthening informal water management structure. However, these measures are rather expensive though they are very welcome by the public. The social measures above mentioned are applicable in both France and Poland. From the financial dimension, all the economical instruments seem to be welcome by the public, except taxes, and do not have economical costs as a constraint. However, the taxes as a fiscal tool has a reason for implementation. The best recommended measure is to implement obligatory insurance system with governmental support. Money for that could be taken from land taxes coming from municipalities with a high risk of flooding. The obligatory insurance is very crucial for low income families living in flood-prone areas. 8. Recommendations The governments of France and Poland should employ more non-structural anti-flood measures to mitigate the losses of communities in case of floods. The present research has made it clear that these non-structural measures are underdeveloped in France and Poland. Both countries can use the present study to look what kind of measures they can implement in their countries. In the present Chapter, the recommendations will be given. On the European level, it will be important to complete proper risk assessment of flood-prone areas as soon as possible. Risk maps should be prepared based on the historical data using the latest technologies for all flood-prone regions in Europe and the accession countries. If this is done on such a large scale, scale and scope advantages can be reached. DG Environment unit B4 responsible for civil protection should be responsible for preparation this kind of information. This unit is responsible for the risk assessment for all kind of risks for humans living in the member states, including the flood risk. While preparing these maps, the Commission should divide the risk of flooding into the slow flood risk and the flash flood risk, because both risks demand different reactions. European Commission DG Environment unit B1, responsible for the EU water framework directive, should implement some recommendations on flood mitigation in the directive. These recommendations should promote a more widely exploration and usage of non-structural anti-flood measures in member states. This will probably not get very much political resistance since non-structural measures do not deal with technical aspects, like building dams and dikes. An important recommendation could be that member states should implement central flood mitigation legislation based on proper risk assessment. So, the rules for building in flood-prone areas should be everywhere the same within the countries, as well as rules about flood recovery. This also holds for France and Poland. France and Poland should evaluate the building of houses in flood-prone areas as soon as the central legislation is implemented in both countries. Also, France and Poland should evaluate the flood recovery program after central legislation on this is implemented. The French government, concerning flood recovery, should investigate the possibilities for the implementation of a new recovery system in which will based on additional special obligatory flod policy in municipalities with the high risk of floooding. The reason for this is that this system will make people better aware of the risk of floods and, consequently, people will be better prepared in case of floods. This system can be combined with increased land tax system for municipalities that are placed in flood-prone areas. The revenues from this tax can be used to subsidise low income families to get a obligatory flood insurance. In Poland it is not so likely that people will insure themselves against the risk of floods due to low standard of living. Since the Polish government has not much money to spend on flood recovery, it will be very important that the Polish government will do its best to enhance risk perception of people, local politicians and experts in flood-prone areas. Good ways to do that are: mass media campaigns, public hearings and education. In Europe and especially in Poland, there should be established a better co-ordination and co-operation of water management bodies, organisations and experts on flood mitigation. Organisations should have the ability to learn from each other, not only from the good practises but also from the bad practises. In Poland, therefore, there should be established a 'water office' to deal with the flooding issue. 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Oxford University Press, Oxford. -Tobin, G. A., Montz, B. E.(1997) Natural Hazards. Explanation and Integration. New York, London, The Guilford Press -Water Framework Directive http://europa.eu.int/eur- lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_327/l_32720001222en00010072.pdf -Wicherek, S. (ed. sc.) (2000) L'eau de la cellule au paysage. Collection environnement. Paris, Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, Shannon, Tokyo, Elsvier -Vademecum of European Civil Protection http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/civil/pdfdocs/vademec.pdf Appendix IX. List if contacts 1. Mr Andrzej Badowski Water Management Office BGW ul. Wawelska 52/54 00-922 Warszawa, Tel +48 22 825 52 93, Fax +48 22 825 14 42 www.bgw.gov.pl 2. Mr Andrzej Borowicz The World Bank Office in Wroclaw Rynek 13 50 101 Wroclaw Tel 48 71 346 02 70 fax 48 71 346 02 75 www.pcu.org 3. Mr Jacek Engel WWF Poland ul. Kaliska 1 m. 9 02-316 Warszawa Tel + 48 22 659-5540 Fax +48 22 824 00 53 www.wwf.pl 4. Ms Ewa Kipert PZU Insurance Al Jana Pawla 2400-133 Warszawa Tel +48 22 582 22 61 Fax +48 22 582 25 45 www.pzu.pl 5. Mr Roman Konieczny IMGW Cracow (OSIRIS Project) Ul Borowego 14 30-215 Krakow Tel 48 12 639 81 39 www.imgw.pl www.ist.osiris.org 6. Mr Aleksander Kruszewski IMGW Cracow (OSIRIS Project) Ul Borowego 14 30-215 Krakow Tel 48 12 639 81 39 www.imgw.pl www.ist.osiris.org 7. Mr Piotr Nieznañski WWF Poand Ul.Drzewieckiego 22/4 54-129 Wroclaw Tel: +48 601-81 70 60 www.wwf.pl 8. Mr Mieczyslaw Rutkowski Water Management Office BGW ul. Wawelska 52/54 00-922 Warszawa, Tel+48 22 825 52 93 Fax +48 22 825 14 12 www.bgw.gov.pl 9. Ms Malgorzata Siudak IMGW Cracow (OSIRIS Project) Ul Borowego 14 30-215 Krakow Tel 48 12 639 81 39 www.imgw.pl www.ist.osiris.org 10. Mr Roman Skapski IMGW Ul Podlesna 6101-673 Warszawa Tel + 48 22 864 06 06 www.imgw.pl 11. Mr Marek Szemplinski Gazeta Wyborcza (newspaper) Pl. Solny 2/3 50-060 Wroclaw Tel +48 71 371 72 95 Fax +48 71 371 72 83www.gazeta.pl 12. Mr Waldemar Tanski Town Hall Raciborz Ul Batorego 6 47 400 Raciborz Tel +48 32 415 34 336 Fax +48 32 415 49 21 13. Mr Tadeusz Tyszka WSPiZ Ul Jagiellonska 59 Tel +48 22 519 21 89 Fax +48 22 834 09 07www.ist.osiris.org 14. Ms Elzbieta Ziolkowska (consultation) Ministery of Environment Depertament of Water Resources ul Wawelska 52/5400-922 Warszawa, Tel +48 22 579 23 39www.mos.gov.pl 1. Mr Cyrille Caffin DIREN Picardie56 rue Julies Barni 80040 Amiens tel:03 22 82 90 60 fax:03 22 97 97 89 2. Mr Jean Froncois Donzier Office international de l'eau21 rue de Madrid 75 008 Paris tel 33 01 44 90 88 60 fax 33 0140 08 01 45www.oieau.org 3. Mr Jean Gaber Ministerie Amenagement du territoire et de l'Environnement 20 av de Sejour70 302 Paris tel 01 42 49 14 24 fax 01 42 19 15 www.environnement.gouv.fr 4. Ms Anne PARVILLE le centre de ressources documentaires de la Direction de l'Environnement du Conseil de la Somme 65 rue de la République80000Amiens Tél. 03.22.71.80.62 Fax 03.22.71.81.59 5. Monsieur Thierry RIGAUX Le Conseil Régional de Picardie4 rue Noyon 80000 AMIENS Tel. 03.22.97.38.18 Fax 03.22.97.38.75www.cr-picardie.fr 6. Mr Bernard Rousseau Président France Nature Environnement, 5, place de la république 45000 Orleans Tél. 02 38 81 80 19 Fax. 02 38 77 05 26www.fne.asso.fr 7. Mr Ruszniewski Directeur Général des Services de la Mairie d' Abbeville1 place Max Lejeune80100 Abbeville tel 03 22 25 43 50 fax 03 22 25 43 17 8. Mme Bernadatta de Vanssay Institute of Psychologie, laboratoire de psychologie de l'environnement 71, av Edvard Vaillent Paris 01.55.20.57.08 9. Mr Alexander de Roo Member of the European Parliament Commitee on the Enviroment, Public Health and Consumer policy tel+32 2 284 226 80 fax +32 2 284 93 www.groenlinks.nl/europa 10. Mr Stefan Scheuer European Environmental Bureau34 Boulevard de Waterloo B-1000 Brussels Tel.: +32 2 289 13 04 (direct)/289 10 90 Fax: + 32 2 289 10 99www.eeb.org 11. Ernst Schulte European Commission DG Env Unit Civil Protection Avenue de Beaulieu 9 B 11 60 Bruxells Tel+ 32 2 296 0224 Fax 294 03 14http://europa-eu.int/comm/environment/civil Appendix X. Abbreviations CCAS des Centres Communaux d'Action Social DG Directorate General DIREN Directions Regionales de l' Environnement EC European Commission EDRIM Electronic Discussion Group for Risq Management EEC European Economic Community ENVISAT Environmental Satellite EPCEM European Postgraduate Course of Environmental Management ERS Economic Research Service ESA l'Agence Spatiale Européenne EU European Union FORMOSE FORMation Ouest, Sud, Est formation aux sciences du risque GIS Geographic Information System IFEN Institute Français de l'Environnement IMGW Institute of Meteorology and Water Management ISIGE Institut Superieur d'Ingenierie de Gestion De l'Environnement ISPA Instrument for Structural Policies for Pre-accession IVM Institute for Environmental Research NGO Non-Governmental Organisation OCHA Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs PPR Plans of Prevention of Risks PPRI Plans of Prevention of Risks of Inundation PTSD Post Traumatic Stress Disorder RZGW Regional Water Management Boards SAGE Water Development and Management Sheme SDAGE Departmental Water Development and Management Shemes SDACR Departmental Shema for Analysing and Covering the Risques STRIM Société Togolaise de Radiologie et d'Imagerie TAP Telematics Application Program UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation WHO World Health Organisation WWF World Wild Foundation |
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